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DEBTS, DIVORCE, AND DISARRAY IN BANKRUPTCY
A HYPOTHETICAL CASE
Several years ago, Mary and John MacDonald divorced after ten years of marriage.1
They had no children. With the help of their lawyers, Mary and John negotiated a separation
agreement, which was intended to settle all of the financial issues between them. The agreement
was ultimately incorporated into the judicial decree of divorce ending their marriage.
Under the settlement agreement, Mary received the marital home and one-half of the
combined value of the parties’ pensions. John received the assets associated with his solelyowned business, and the other half of the pension benefits. John also assumed full responsibility
for repayment of the couple’s debts, which had been incurred jointly by John and Mary during
their marriage. The debts consisted of a mortgage on the family home, a loan used to finance the
acquisition of John’s business assets, and the balance owed on John’s and Mary’s joint credit
card account. In exchange for this relatively favorable property settlement, Mary, whose earning
capacity was less than John’s, waived all claims to future support.
One year after the divorce, John closed his business. In the process, he made a charitable
donation of the business assets which had been allocated to him in the divorce proceeding. Then
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The hypothetical case in the text is loosely based on the facts of MacDonald v.
MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 69 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 68-71.

-2he stopped making payments on the mortgage, business and credit card debts which had been
allocated to him for repayment, and filed for bankruptcy. While John’s bankruptcy proceeding
was pending, all three creditors approached Mary for payment of these debts. Mary quickly
became the target of unpleasant collection efforts, including a threat by the mortgage lender to
foreclose on her home.
Mary, who had planned her financial future in reliance on John’s agreement to assume
full responsibility for all of the liabilities of their marriage, found herself in immediate financial
jeopardy. First, the marital creditors were clearly entitled under state law to collect their loans
from Mary, based on her joint contractual liability under the original loan agreements. Notably,
the earlier divorce proceeding had no impact on the rights of the creditors, who were not parties
in that case.
As to Mary’s legal rights against John in these circumstances, various federal bankruptcy
and state family law doctrines offered potential theories of relief for Mary. However, when
Mary sought judicial relief from the effects of her former husband’s bankruptcy, not all of the
available theories of relief were identified by her lawyer or addressed by the courts. Due in large
part to these omissions, Mary ultimately found no adequate protection for her financial interests
and expectations.
This Article examines the state and federal laws that govern the rights of former spouses
and third-party creditors in cases, like the hypothetical case of Mary and John MacDonald, where
debts incurred during marriage are allocated at the time of divorce to a spouse who subsequently
declares bankruptcy. The legal relationships established among the parties in these
circumstances, under all of the relevant federal and state doctrines, are complex. This Article
examines and attempts to solve the recurring analytical problems that have arisen in cases where

-3the spouse to whom marital debts were allocated at the time of divorce subsequently declares
bankruptcy.
INTRODUCTION
As illustrated in the preceding hypothetical case of Mary and John MacDonald, the
settlement of a divorcing couple’s financial affairs typically involves the allocation of
responsibility for the debts they incurred during marriage. A provision in the couple’s separation
agreement or divorce decree allocating the responsibility for repayment to one spouse creates
new and enforceable obligations to the other. The obligated former spouse who subsequently
declares bankruptcy, like John in the hypothetical case above, may intend thereby to discharge
all liability arising under both the original loan agreements and the divorce decree. In response,
the bankruptcy debtor’s former partner may claim that the debtor’s various obligations relating to
the allocated marital debts are nondischargeable in bankruptcy. Finally, if the debtor prevails on
this issue, the former spouse may return to state family court seeking the adjustment of other
financial orders in their divorce decree. A thorough analysis of the rights of each former spouse
and the third-party creditors in all of these circumstances is a complex matter.
Section I of this Article describes the state laws governing the allocation of marital debts
between divorcing spouses. Next, this Section delineates the legal relationship established
between former spouses when one of them assumes the sole responsibility for repaying debts
incurred during marriage, as well as the ongoing relationships of the third-party marital creditors
with each former spouse. Notably, the allocation of debts typically results in multiple, discrete
liabilities for the obligated spouse. He or she remains contractually liable to the third-party
creditors, and assumes new obligations to the other spouse as well.

-4Section II discusses the two statutory exceptions to the discharge of debts established
under the Bankruptcy Code for certain divorce-related obligations of the bankruptcy debtor. The
statutory exceptions extend to the debtor’s family support debts and to certain property
settlement obligations. Section II explores the applicability of these exceptions from discharge
in the situation where debts incurred during marriage were allocated by the divorce court to the
bankruptcy debtor for repayment. Next, Section III describes the significance of a ruling of
nondischargeability in bankruptcy for each interested party—the third-party marital creditor, the
bankruptcy debtor and the debtor’s former spouse—as to each aspect of the debtor’s liability
under the original loan agreements and under the divorce decree. Section III also examines the
relevant case law, which has often failed to identify and separately evaluate the several
obligations of the bankruptcy debtor in these circumstances.
Section IV first explores certain complications that arise under bankruptcy laws
governing the timing of nondischargeability claims by the debtor’s former spouse, and the
forums in which such claims may be raised. Specifically, certain claims relating to the debts
incurred during marriage and allocated to the debtor at the time of divorce may be raised during
the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding or after the bankruptcy case is closed. Furthermore, the
claims may be made either in bankruptcy court or in state court. Here, the delayed timing of
claims creates problems about finality in litigation, and the rule of concurrent jurisdiction raises
questions about the relationship between the federal and state courts.
An additional set of complications explored in Section IV follows from the ongoing
jurisdiction of the state family courts over the financial affairs of divorced couples, under state
laws governing family support and property settlement obligations. These state law doctrines
must be reconciled with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, whenever a bankruptcy debtor’s

-5former spouse seeks post-bankruptcy relief in the family court. The task of reconciling state and
federal doctrines and policies is especially challenging in the situation discussed in this Article,
where the bankruptcy debtor was assigned the responsibility for repaying joint marital debts at
the time of divorce.
This Article provides a road map for understanding and analyzing the doctrinal and
policy issues that arise when the former spouse to whom marital debts were allocated in a
divorce proceeding subsequently declares bankruptcy.
I.

THE ALLOCATION BY THE DIVORCE COURT OF DEBTS INCURRED
DURING MARRIAGE
The family courts in every state wield great power over the financial interests of

divorcing couples. In addition to support orders for dependent family members, divorce courts
have the authority to make orders affecting the ownership of property.2 The property orders in a
divorce decree may require one spouse to transfer certain assets to the other in order to achieve a
fair distribution of property at the end of their marriage. In many states, this judicial power was
first established in legislation enacted during the 1970s and 80s as part of the new, no-fault
divorce codes.3
Modern equitable distribution laws define the assets that are subject to distribution, and
set out factors for the divorce court to consider in allocating these assets between the spouses.4
For many divorcing couples, however, no fair economic settlement is possible unless the court

2

See JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW chs. 9-10 (2d ed.
1995) (discussing the authority of divorce courts over family support and property issues).
3

See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 46-47 (1985) (describing the
enactment of modern equitable distribution statutes in the United States).
4

GREGORY ET AL., supra note 2, §§ 10.03, 10.12.

-6also addresses the liabilities of the marriage. Surprisingly, then, most of the state statutes refer
only to assets.5 Currently, the divorce codes in just a handful of states include a provision
regarding the allocation of responsibility between divorcing spouses for the repayment of debts.6
In the remaining states, the courts have generally understood the importance of debts in settling
the financial affairs of the parties, and have exercised their equitable powers to allocate debts as

5

See J. THOMAS OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
§ 13.03[4] (2002). Most equitable distribution statutes refer to the debts of the parties in the list
of factors that the court must consider in making a fair distribution of assets. See GREGORY ET
AL., supra note 2, § 9.12, at 250. For example, the Pennsylvania equitable distribution statute
provides:
In an action for divorce . . . [t]he court shall . . . equitably divide, distribute or
assign, in kind or otherwise, the marital property between the parties . . . [i]n such
proportions and in such manner as the court deems just after considering all
relevant factors, including: . . . [t]he age, health, station, amount and sources of
income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of
the parties.
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502(a)(3) (West 2001) (emphasis added). This type of reference to
liabilities in the equitable distribution statute does not, however, confer any authority on the
court to allocate responsibility between the spouses for their debts.
6

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 507(a) (1999) (“The Family Court . . . shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over . . . the division and distribution of marital property and marital debts
. . . incident to . . . a separation or divorce.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075 (West 1997 & Supp.
2004) (“[I]n distributing the marital assets and liabilities between the parties, the court must
begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal . . . .”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 58047(a) (1999) (“Upon granting a divorce . . . the court may make any further orders . . . allocating,
as between the parties, the responsibility for the payment of the debts of the parties . . . .”); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (West 2003) (“[I]n a proceeding for dissolution of the marriage . . . the
court shall . . . divide the marital property and marital debts . . . .”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-35(1)(c)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2003) (“The court shall include the following in every decree of
divorce: . . . an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities . . . .”); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(C) (Michie 2000) (“The court shall
also have the authority to apportion and order the payment of the debts of the parties, or either of
them . . . .”).

-7well as assets in divorce proceedings.7 As discussed at length below, the allocation of debts in
this manner in a divorce proceeding has no impact on the rights of the third-party marital
creditors.8
Whereas most equitable distribution statutes define the types of assets that are subject to
distribution in a divorce proceeding, the definition of “marital debts” for this purpose has been
left to the courts, even in jurisdictions where the divorce code expressly confers judicial
authority to distribute debts as well as assets.9 There is no uniform definition. The limitations
most commonly imposed involve the exclusion of debts incurred prior to marriage and debts
incurred for other than a marital purpose.10
The debts of the spouses that become subject to equitable allocation at the time of divorce
may have been owed to the third-party creditors by one or both spouses during the marriage.
The rules governing the liability of spouses for their debts in an ongoing marriage differ under

7

See 3 FAMILY LAW AND PRACTICE § 37.14, at 224-25 (Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 1998)
(collecting cases); Brett R. Turner, The Hidden Part of the Marital Estate: Classifying, Valuing,
and Dividing Marital Debts, 3 DIVORCE LITIG. 29-32 (1991).
8

See infra text accompanying notes ___-___.

9

See Turner, supra note 7, at ___. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(5)(a)(1) (West 1997
& Supp. 2004) (“‘Marital assets and liabilities’ include: [a]ssets acquired and liabilities incurred
during the marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by them . . . .”).
10

See Turner, supra note 7, at 23 (“In most states, a marital debt is any debt incurred
during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties.”). The limitation of marital debts to those
used “for a marital purpose” or “for the joint benefit of the parties” requires further inquiry into
the scope of the shared purposes and shared benefits in marriage. As a general rule, expenditures
for the legitimate goals of either spouse can be, and often are, viewed as accomplishing a shared
purpose in the context of marriage. The American Law Institute has avoided this issue in
formulating its definition of marital debt in the recently published Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution. Section 4.09 creates a presumption that all debts incurred during marriage,
with a few specific exceptions such as educational loans, are marital debts subject to allocation
by the divorce court. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.09 cmt. g (2002).

-8the two systems of marital property law in the United States. In the nine community property
states, both the ownership of assets and the responsibility for debts are generally shared by the
spouses.11 By way of contrast, in the common law or separate property states, both the
ownership of property and the responsibility for debts are largely unaffected by the existence of
the marriage relationship. The legal regime is one of separate property during marriage, and the
principle of marriage as an economic partnership is implemented only upon the death of one
spouse or termination of the marriage by divorce.12
As a general rule in the common law property states, the respective liability of each
spouse for debts during marriage is established according to the principles of contract law:
whoever promises the creditor that payment will be made is legally responsible for the debt.13
Thus, for example, a joint credit card account is the responsibility of both spouses, but an
education loan is the student spouse’s sole responsibility unless the creditor also obtained the
promise of the other spouse to repay the loan.
The rights of a third-party creditor, established by the contract executed with a married
couple during marriage, are not affected by the debtors’ subsequent divorce. If the divorcing

11

See W.S. MCCLANAHAN, COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 10.6
(1983); ROBERT L. MENNELL & THOMAS M. BOYKOFF, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL
269-303 (2d ed. 1988); JOSEPH W. SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 386-87 (Aspen 2001).
There are many variations among community property states as to the manner in which
responsibility for debts is allocated between the spouses during marriage. See MENNELL &
BOYKOFF at 269-303.
12
13

See SINGER, supra note 11, at 380-82.

See 1 JOSEPH W. MCKNIGHT, VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
§ 13.05, at 13-97 (2002). The common law doctrine of necessaries and state family expense
statutes constitute exceptions to the general rule that liability for debts in the common law
property states is governed by contract principles. Under these doctrines, a spouse may become
liable for goods or services provided to other family members, even though he or she was not
involved in purchasing them. Id. § 13.06[1][b].

-9spouses agree that one of them will become solely responsible for a joint debt, the agreement
does not change the rights of the third-party creditor to pursue both of them for payment.14 Even
if the divorce court incorporates the spouses’ agreement into the divorce decree, the rights of the
creditor are unaffected. This result follows from the general rule in civil litigation that a court
order can affect only individuals who are parties to the lawsuit.15 Unless a creditor is somehow
joined as a party in the divorce proceeding,16 the divorce court is without power to affect the
creditor’s rights. Thus, the creditor’s right to collect a joint marital debt from either spouse
remains intact, even if the divorce court allocates sole responsibility, as between the spouses, to
just one of them. Similarly, if the divorce court happens to order one spouse to assume
responsibility for a debt for which the other partner was solely liable during the marriage, the
creditor’s recourse in the event of nonpayment remains exclusively against the partner who
incurred the debt.17

14

Basic contract law principles would require the participation of the creditor in such an
agreement in order to affect the creditor’s interests. See generally ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS ch. 71 (Interim ed. 2002) (discussing doctrine of contract novation).
15

See generally JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.13, at 699 (3d ed.
2002) (“Our notions of due process require this result because individuals who are tied to a
judgment in a suit in which they had no opportunity to be heard rightly could claim that there had
been a denial of due process.”).
16

The involvement of a marital creditor in divorce litigation is unlikely, and appears to be
foreclosed by the jurisdictional rules in some states. See Eberley v. Eberley, 489 A.2d 433, 446
(Del. 1985) (reversing divorce court’s order allowing intervention by a third-party creditor as
beyond the scope of the divorce court’s jurisdiction). See generally BRETT R. TURNER,
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY §§ 3.03, 3.04, 3.44 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1995)
(discussing participation of third parties in divorce litigation).
17

The general rule described in the text, that divorce has no impact on the rights of
creditors, is set out in the Utah Code, as follows: “On the entering of a decree of divorce . . . of
joint debtors in contract, the claim of a creditor remains unchanged . . . .” UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 15-4-6.5(1) (2001). See also Moline v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d
956 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that credit reporting agency did not violate federal reporting law by

-10The powerlessness of the divorce court over third-party creditors leads to a disconnect in
many cases, between the responsibilities described in the divorce decree and the real, ongoing
liability of the spouses. When the divorce court allocates responsibility for marital debts to one
spouse, the other may make future plans which do not include setting aside funds to repay the
creditors. The resulting personal financial plans can be upset, however, if the creditors
subsequently exercise their continuing rights to pursue the second spouse for payment of the
debts incurred during marriage.
A recent (year 2000) amendment to the marriage dissolution statute in Arizona, a
community property state, requires the dissolution courts to advise spouses about their respective
responsibilities for marital debts following the termination of their marriage, as follows:
In all actions for the dissolution of marriage or legal separation the court shall
require the following statement in the materials provided to the petitioner and to
be served on the respondent: Notice. In your property settlement agreement or
decree of dissolution or legal separation, the court may assign responsibility for
certain community debts to one spouse or the other. Please be aware that a court
order that does this is binding on the spouses only and does not necessarily relieve
either of you from your responsibility for these community debts. These debts are
matters of contract between both of you and your creditors . . . . Since your

listing past-due account on former husband’s credit report, even though divorce court had
assigned sole responsibility for the account to former wife); Pinson v. Cole, 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d
113 (Cal. App. Ct. 2003) (ruling that creditor of former wife had no right to enforce a divorce
court order requiring the former husband to repay her debt).

-11creditors are not parties to this court case, they are not bound by court orders or
any agreements you and your spouse reach in this case.18
Whereas this Arizona statute is designed to provide information to the former spouses, a related
provision in the Utah equitable distribution statute recognizes that the third-party creditors may
also be interested in the results of their debtors’ divorce proceedings. The Utah statute governing
the judicial allocation of marital debts provides that the divorce court must enter “an order
requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees regarding the court’s division of
debt, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties’ separate, current addresses . . . .”19 The
provisions of both the Arizona and Utah statutes are premised on the rule that judicial decrees
allocating marital debts do not limit the rights of the divorcing couple’s creditors.
When the divorce court orders one spouse to repay a joint marital debt, a new obligation
is created. Specifically, the spouse to whom the debt is allocated (the obligor) becomes
obligated to the other spouse (the obligee) to satisfy their joint debt to the third-party creditor. In
the event that the obligor fails to comply with the court order, several judicial remedies may be
available to the obligee, including contempt and the attachment of assets and future earnings of
the obligor,20 to enforce the court’s repayment order. This type of enforcement becomes
available, for example, when the divorce court orders one former spouse to assume responsibility
for a joint marital credit card debt, the obligor thereafter fails to keep the payments current, and
the obligee learns of this when he or she is contacted by the credit card company for payment. In

18

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-318(F) (2002).

19

UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1)(c)(ii) (1998 & Supp. 2003).

20

See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 16.6, at 671-76 (2d ed. 1988).

-12these circumstances, the obligee has no right to insist that the credit card company collect
payments from the obligor. Rather, the available remedy is an action in the divorce court,
seeking enforcement of the repayment provision of the divorce decree.21
Frequently, the parties in their settlement agreements and the courts in divorce decrees
include an additional provision requiring the obligor spouse to hold the other harmless as to
marital debts. This type of provision creates a second, distinct obligation between the former
spouses, in addition to the repayment obligation described above. The hold harmless provision
imposes an obligation of indemnification on the obligor, requiring reimbursement to the other
former spouse in the event that the creditor actually collects the debt from him or her.22 Thus, in
the example of the joint credit card debt assigned by the divorce court to the obligor spouse, if
the obligor fails to make payments, and the obligee assumes this responsibility when contacted
by the lender, the obligee can turn around and recover the amounts paid. Like the repayment
obligation between the former spouses, the hold harmless obligation created by the divorce
decree is generally enforceable in subsequent judicial proceedings.
Clearly, the court order allocating sole responsibility for joint marital debts to one former
spouse does not guarantee financial security for the other, because the divorce court cannot
relieve either spouse of pre-existing liability to marital creditors. In the event of noncompliance
by the obligated former spouse to whom the divorce court allocated marital debts, the third-party
creditor is entitled to pursue the other former spouse for payment. In order to protect his or her
financial rights, the obligee must then initiate a post-divorce enforcement proceeding against the

21

See infra text accompanying notes 133-35 for additional discussion of the enforcement
of the financial provisions in divorce decrees.
22

See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 737 (7th ed. 1999) (defining hold harmless agreement).

-13noncompliant former partner. The obligee may face even greater financial jeopardy, in the event
that the obligated former spouse subsequently declares bankruptcy.23
The federal Bankruptcy Code provide generally for the discharge by an individual debtor
of personal liability for pre-bankruptcy debts.24 The debts dischargeable in this manner may
include the liabilities imposed on a debtor under the provisions of a pre-bankruptcy divorce
decree.25 Often, the bankruptcy debtor’s divorce-related debts involve direct payments to the
former spouse, in the nature of either support for dependent family members or property
distributions. The debtor’s dischargeable divorce-related debts may also include liabilities
arising from the debts to third-party creditors incurred during marriage. The release of the
bankruptcy debtor from responsibility as to these obligations would leave the other former
spouse solely responsible for repayment to the third-party marital creditors under the terms of
their original loan agreements.26 This result would follow, even if the divorce court had
allocated the debts incurred during marriage to the debtor for repayment.
The Bankruptcy Code establishes important exceptions from discharge for two types of
divorce-related debts—family support debts and certain property settlement obligations.27 The
next Section discusses the applicability of these exceptions from discharge to the bankruptcy

23

See Catherine E. Vance, Till Debt Do Us Part: Irreconcilable Differences in the
Unhappy Union of Bankruptcy and Divorce, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 369, 429 (1997) (describing the
disappointed expectations of a bankruptcy debtor’s former spouse in these circumstances).
24

HENRY J. SOMMER ET AL., COLLIER FAMILY LAW AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE ¶ 1.06,
at 1-62 (1997).
25

See id. ¶ 6.01.

26

Id. ¶ 6.05[5].

27

Id. ¶ 1.06.

-14debtor’s obligations arising from the earlier allocation of debts incurred during marriage to the
debtor for repayment. The designation of these obligations as potentially nondischargeable
family support or property settlement obligations has important consequences for both former
spouses and for the third-party marital creditors.
II.

THE APPLICATION OF BANKRUPTCY CODE §§ 523(a)(5) AND 523(a)(15) TO
THIRD-PARTY DEBTS INCURRED DURING MARRIAGE AND ALLOCATED
TO THE DEBTOR AT THE TIME OF DIVORCE
There is a correlation between divorce and bankruptcy in the lives of many individuals.28

On the one hand, financial problems during marriage are one major factor associated with
divorce.29 Conversely, divorce can create or exacerbate financial problems because of the added
costs generally associated with maintaining two households.30 Finally, one or both former
spouses may use the bankruptcy process following divorce as a planned means to escape
responsibility for certain divorce-related obligations along with other types of debt.
As a general rule, the individual debtor who successfully petitions for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code is entitled to a discharge from personal liability for preexisting debts, following the distribution of available assets to creditors.31 The Code establishes

28

See Vance, supra note 23, at 394 (collecting cases involving dischargeability of
divorce-related debts in bankruptcy, and noting that time between divorce and bankruptcy in
most cases was under one year).
29

Yvonne M. Lada, Comment, Something Every Divorce Attorney Should Know About
Bankruptcy, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 735, 735 (1999).
30

See 1 MCKNIGHT, supra note 13, § 13-1, at 13-5; SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24,
¶ 6.05(5), at xiii (“In some parts of the country as many as half of all marriages end in divorce,
often due, at least in part, to financial difficulties. Even when the divorce was not caused by
money problems, the financial consequences to the former spouses now living as two households
are often dire.”).
31

1COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 103[2][d] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2001).
Individual debtors are eligible to file for bankruptcy reorganization under Chapters 11 and 13, as

-15exceptions from discharge for several categories of debts, including two types of divorce-related
obligations. First, Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(5)32 provides for the nondischargeability of all
debts owed by the bankruptcy debtor to other family members, which arose under a separation
agreement, divorce decree, or other court order, and which are in the nature of alimony,
maintenance or support. Section 523(a)(15)33 additionally provides for the nondischargeability
of some, but not all, divorce-related debts which are not in the nature of support. Typically,
§ 523(a)(15) debts involve the reallocation of marital wealth intended to achieve a fair economic
settlement between divorcing spouses. In the bankruptcy context, the term “property settlement
obligations” is used to identify nonsupport debts arising under the parties’ separation agreement
or divorce decree whose dischargeability is governed by § 523(a)(15).
The obligations contemplated by the two divorce-related exceptions to discharge in
bankruptcy may take several forms. Most often, the exceptions to discharge apply to a debtor’s
obligations to make payments or transfer assets directly to the former spouse or to agencies that
collect support payments on behalf of minor children. A second category of divorce-related
obligations includes debts payable directly to third-party creditors for post-divorce family
expenses, such as the post-divorce education expenses of children. Finally, the debtor’s divorce-

well as bankruptcy liquidation under Chapter 7, of the Bankruptcy Code. See SHAYNA M.
STEINFELD & BRUCE R. STEINFELD, THE FAMILY LAWYER’S GUIDE TO BANKRUPTCY 2 (2002).
Generally speaking, there are many important differences between bankruptcy reorganization
and bankruptcy liquidation for the debtor and his or her creditors, but few of the differences are
relevant to the issues discussed in this Article.
32
33

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2001).

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). Notably, § 523(a)(15) does not apply to bankruptcy cases
arising under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. An exception to this rule, however, applies in
cases involving a “hardship discharge” under Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), (b),
discussed in 2 ROBERT E. GINSBERG & ROBERT D. MARTIN, GINSBERG & MARTIN ON
BANKRUPTCY § 15.06 (4th ed. Supp. 1999).

-16related obligations may involve debts that first arose during the marriage, such as the obligation
to repay the mortgage on the family home or credit card debts. As to such pre-divorce debts
owed to third-party creditors, the bankruptcy debtor may have been ordered by the divorce court
to assume sole responsibility for repayment and to hold the former spouse harmless. The
resulting obligations between the former spouses, like the other forms of debt arising under a
separation agreement or divorce decree, may be nondischargeable in bankruptcy under
§ 523(a)(5) or § 523(a)(15).
A.

The Dischargeability of Support Obligations Under § 523(a)(5)

Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(5)(B) creates an exception from discharge for “any debt . . . to
a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of
such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree . . . or property
settlement agreement . . . .”34 This exception from discharge in bankruptcy embodies the priority
assigned by Congress to the fulfillment of family support responsibilities. The determination
that this family-related policy outweighs the competing financial interests of the debtor in
bankruptcy has a long history. “The exception from discharge for family support debts
originally was formulated by the United States Supreme Court in a trilogy of cases at the
beginning of [the twentieth] century. Congress codified the exception in 1903.”35
The exception to discharge for family support debts under § 523(a)(5) focuses on the
purpose of the debtor’s obligations, rather than the form they take.36 Notably, the obligations
imposed on the debtor under a separation agreement or divorce decree requiring the debtor to

34

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B).

35

GREGORY ET AL., supra note 2, § 9.08[A], at 359-60.

36

See SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 6.03[4].

-17repay debts incurred during marriage can survive the debtor’s bankruptcy, if they meet the
family support standard of § 523(a)(5).37 The bankruptcy judge in a recent case explained why
the debtor’s repayment and hold harmless obligations to a former spouse are included in this
manner within the purview of § 523(a)(5), as follows:
Debt assumption and hold harmless agreements are common features of divorcerelated property settlements and court decrees. Unlike lump sum or installment
payment covenants, they do not put money into the pocket of their beneficiary.
Rather they operate to protect (to the extent possible) one spouse from liability or
. . . from potential liability. The protection they afford may provide essential
maintenance or support.38
This broad construction is supported by the legislative history of § 523(a)(5). Although
the nearly identical House and Senate Reports first stated that “[Section 523(a)(5)] will apply to
make nondischargeable only alimony, maintenance or support owed directly to a spouse or
dependent,” they proceeded to expressly include hold harmless obligations, as follows:
This provision will, however, make nondischargeable any debts resulting from an
agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor’s spouse harmless on joint debts, to the
extent that the agreement is in payment of alimony, maintenance, or support of
the spouse, as determined under bankruptcy law considerations that are similar to

37

See Calhoun v. Calhoun (In re Calhoun), 715 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1983);
SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 6.03[4], at 6-23 to -24.
38

omitted).

Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290, 297 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996) (footnotes

-18considerations of whether a particular agreement to pay money to a spouse is
actually alimony or a property settlement.39
This extension of the support exception to include harmless debts is premised on the same
underlying policy as the exception itself. Here, “Congress has recognized the legitimate needs of
the dependents of a bankruptcy debtor and has overridden the general bankruptcy policy [relating
to the interests of the bankruptcy debtor] in which exceptions to discharge are construed
narrowly.”40
In the bankruptcy law context, § 523(a)(5) support debts are automatically
nondischargeable. All other divorce-related obligations, which are characterized as “property
settlement obligations,” do not share the characteristic of automatic nondischargeability. Not
surprisingly, then, the key legal issue in many cases arising under § 523(a)(5) is whether a
particular divorce-related debt, set out in the debtor’s separation agreement or divorce decree, is
a support debt or a property settlement obligation.
The legal standard for identifying nondischargeable family support debts is a federal law
standard, which frequently requires judicial application in individual bankruptcy cases.41 The
bankruptcy judge in a recent case described how often the courts must make this distinction
between support debts, on the one hand, and the property settlement obligations not included
under § 523(a)(5), on the other hand, as follows: “Applying § 523(a)(5) has become a common

39

S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865; H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 364 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320.
40
41

4 COLLIER, supra note 31, ¶ 523.11(2), at 523-78.

See id. ¶ 523.11[1]. As described at length in a later Section of this Article, these
frequent determinations of dischargeability of debts under § 503(a)(5) are made in both the
federal bankruptcy courts and state family courts. See infra text accompanying notes 107-10.

-19exercise for the bankruptcy courts. To assess its applicability in this case involves a trek over
well-trod ground.”42
The same general standard for identifying nondischargeable support debts is applied,
whether the form of the debt involves the allocation of responsibility to the bankruptcy debtor for
pre-divorce marital obligations or the more common direct payment obligation to the former
spouse. The following formulation of the support standard is tailored to the context of
obligations to repay marital debts and to hold the former spouse harmless as to those debts,
arising under the bankruptcy debtor’s separation agreement:
In making the determination of whether [the] agreement is dischargeable under
section 523(a)(5), courts look to . . . [various] factors . . . in an attempt to
determine both the intent of the agreement and the actual function it served.
Generally, when the agreement appears to be a result of the parties’ imbalance in
income, expenses and earning capacity, and when the failure of the debtor to pay
would impair the nondebtor spouse’s ability to maintain his or her expected
standard of living or support the couple’s children, the obligation to pay debts or
hold the nondebtor spouse harmless is found [to be] in the nature of support.43
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Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290, 295 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996). See also
GREGORY ET AL., supra note 2, § 8.08, at 297 (describing the “enormous volume of litigation”
involving the distinction in bankruptcy cases between support debts and property settlements).
43

SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 6.05(5), at 6-14 (footnotes omitted). See generally
GREGORY ET AL., supra note 2, § 9.08[A], at 361 (discussing the judicial application of these
same factors to determine whether divorce-related obligations in the form of direct payments to
the bankruptcy debtor’s former spouse are dischargeable support debts); Peter C. Alexander,
Divorce and the Dischargeability of Debts: Focusing on Women As Creditors in Bankruptcy, 43
CATH. U. L. REV. 351, 380-87 (1994) (describing lack of consistency in formulation and
application of the support standard). Most courts have ruled that the determination of
dependency under § 523(a)(5) must focus on the circumstances of the parties at the time of

-20If the bankruptcy debtor’s dependent former spouse can satisfy this standard, he or she may be
protected against the financial burden of sole responsibility for the repayment of debts incurred
during marriage, in spite of the debtor’s bankruptcy.
B.

The Dischargeability of Property Settlement Obligations Under § 523(a)(15)

The courts ruling on claims of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(5) typically use the
term “property settlements” to label divorce-related obligations that do not satisfy the federal
standard, described above, for nondischargeable family support debts. Until 1994, all such
nonsupport, divorce-related obligations were dischargeable in bankruptcy. Then Congress
enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which added an exception from discharge for some,
but not all, property settlement obligations. This additional exception from discharge for certain
divorce-related, non-support obligations, codified in § 523(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Code,44 was
intended to further protect the financial interests of the divorced bankruptcy debtor’s family.
Thus, “Congress enacted § 523(a)(15) in an attempt to lessen the chance that a divorce obligee’s
claims might slip through § 523(a)(5)’s cracks and be discharged unjustly.”45
Section 523(a)(15) sets forth standards to determine whether the property settlement
obligations in a particular case are dischargeable debts, if the former spouse raises the issue in a
timely fashion during the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding. In these circumstances, property
settlement obligations are nondischargeable unless the court determines that either:

divorce, not at the time of the debtor’s bankruptcy. There is, however, a minority position on
this issue. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
44

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (2001).

45

Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290, 300 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996).

-21(A) the debtor does not have the ability to pay such debt from income or property
of the debtor not reasonably necessary to be expended for the maintenance or
support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor and, if the debtor is engaged in
a business, for the payment of expenditures necessary for the continuation,
preservation, and operation of such business; or (B) discharging such debt would
result in a benefit to the debtor that outweighs the detrimental consequences to a
spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor.46
These standards require the courts to consider the present financial circumstances of the
bankruptcy debtor and the former spouse, in determining whether to discharge the debtor’s
property settlement obligations.47
Like the legislative history of § 523(a)(5), the 1994 Congressional Report regarding
§ 523(a)(15) specifically addresses the hold harmless obligations of the bankruptcy debtor
associated with the allocation of marital debts by a divorce court. The Congressional Report
states that these obligations are encompassed within the exception to discharge in bankruptcy

46
47

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15).

Following the enactment of § 523(a)(15), scholars criticized the failure of Congress to
address several important matters affecting the respective rights of the bankruptcy debtor and the
former spouse. The questions left unresolved by Congress included: which party has the burden
of proof in § 523(a)(15) cases, how the bankruptcy debtor’s “inability to pay” should be
measured under § 523(a)(15)(A), what factors are relevant in the balancing test established under
§ 523(a)(15)(B), and whether property settlements can be partially discharged. See JUDITH K.
FITZGERALD & RAMONA M. ARENA BAKER, BANKRUPTCY AND DIVORCE 30-36 (2d ed. Supp.
1997); Peter C. Alexander, Building “A Doll’s House”: A Feminist Analysis of Marital Debt
Dischargeability in Bankruptcy, 48 VILL. L. REV. 381, 404-11 (2003); Veryl Victoria Miles, The
Nondischargeability of Divorce-Based Debts in Bankruptcy: A Legislative Response to the
Hardened Heart, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1171, 1183-1216 (1997); Vance, supra note 23, at 369
(emphasizing the negative effect for women, who are typically the creditor spouses in
§ 523(a)(15) proceedings, flowing from the lack of clarity in the statute); Meredith Johnson,
Note, At the Intersection of Bankruptcy and Divorce: Property Division Debts Under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 122-32 (1997).

-22established by § 523(a)(15) for certain property settlement obligations.48 Early scholarly
commentary about § 523(a)(15) anticipated that the new discharge exception might supplant
§ 523(a)(5), and become the sole basis for preserving the debtor’s hold harmless obligations to a
former spouse.49 Such a shift in the analysis of hold harmless obligations would predictably
have been costly for the dependent family members of bankruptcy debtors. Scholars anticipated
that claims of nondischargeability would be more difficult to establish under the debtor-focused
standards of § 523(a)(15) than under the § 523(a)(5) support standard.50
However, this predicted shift in the analysis of cases involving the debtor’s divorcerelated obligations to repay marital debts and hold the former spouse harmless has not, in fact,
occurred. In cases where the former spouse’s pleadings include claims under both § 523(a)(5)
and § 523(a)(15), the courts routinely first consider the possibility of preserving the divorce-

48

See H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 55, reprinted in1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340 , 3364.

49

See Brian B. Rothenberg, Note, The Dischargeability of Marital Obligations: Three
Justifications for the Repeal of § 523(a)(15), 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 135, 158 (1996); Miles, supra
note 47, at 1179; Vance, supra note 23, at 390-392, 416, 434 n.173.
50

This concern regarding the relationship between § 523(a)(5) and § 523(a)(15) was
summarized by one scholar, as follows:
According to the House Report, § 523(a)(15) was drafted with hold harmless
agreements partially in mind. Prior to the [enactment of § 523(a)(15)], courts
usually characterized these types of obligations as support debts, thereby
excepting them from discharge. With this language in the legislative history,
though, most courts will probably now analyze hold harmless agreements under
§ 523(a)(15). Because the debtor, who by definition is in poor financial
condition, can easily prove his inability to pay such debt, most of the hold
harmless obligations will undoubtedly be discharged.
Rothenberg, supra note 49, at 158 (footnotes omitted).

-23related debts as nondischargeable support obligations, and proceed to consider the § 523(a)(15)
claim only if the § 523(a)(5) claim has failed.51
III.

THE LEGAL EFFECT FOR EACH PARTY WHEN THE DEBTOR’S
OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE ALLOCATION OF PRE-DIVORCE
DEBTS ARE DETERMINED TO BE NONDISCHARGEABLE IN BANKRUPTCY
The allocation of debts incurred during a couple’s marriage by the divorce court results in

a complex set of financial relationships. First, as discussed above, the divorce decree cannot
affect the interests of the third-party creditor, and the direct liability of each spouse to the
creditor continues to be governed by the terms of their original loan agreement.52 For example,
if both spouses were jointly liable under the loan agreement, the creditor retains the right to
collect the debt from either or both, in spite of the divorce decree allocating responsibility for
repayment to just one spouse. Second, a provision in the divorce decree ordering the debtor
spouse to repay marital debts creates a new, enforceable obligation to the other former spouse.

51

See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson (In re Gibson), 219 B.R. 195 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998);
Dressler v. Dressler (In re Dressler), 194 B.R. 290 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1996); Kennard v. Kennard (In
re Kennard), 259 B.R. 146 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). Cf. Winegarden v. Winegarden (In re
Winegarden), 719 A.2d 678 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (affirming jurisdiction in a postbankruptcy state court proceeding to consider the nondischargeability of debtor’s hold harmless
obligation under § 523(a)(5), even though the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the former
spouse’s § 523(a)(15) claim).
The proposed Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, discussed in
Trisha L. Baggs, Comment, Bankruptcy Reform of 2001: A Hollow Victory for CreditorSpouses, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 967, 986-88 (2002), includes changes to both § 523(a)(5) and
§ 523(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Code. See H.R. 975, 108th Congress (2003), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov. Notably, the Act would extend the exception to discharge to all property
settlement obligations of the bankruptcy debtor in Chapter 7 cases. See id. The proposed
changes would not affect the analysis of the special issues involving debts incurred during
marriage and allocated to the bankruptcy debtor at the time of divorce, which are the focus of
this Article.
52

See supra text accompanying notes 15-19 (discussing the effect of marital debt
allocation on creditors’ rights).

-24Finally, an additional provision in the divorce decree ordering the debtor to hold his or her
former spouse harmless as to the marital debts creates another direct and enforceable obligation
between the parties. Specifically, the debtor is obligated to indemnify the former spouse for any
future payments made by the former spouse to the creditors of the marriage.
If a dispute subsequently arises regarding the dischargeability in bankruptcy of the
debtor’s divorce-related debts under § 523(a)(5) and § 523(a)(15), a thorough analysis would
require the separate consideration of each of the debtor’s three discrete obligations in this
situation. If a judicial determination of nondischargeability is made, the question arises as to
which of the debtor’s obligations—the debt to the creditor incurred during marriage, the
obligation to the former spouse to repay that debt, or the obligation to hold the former spouse
harmless—are preserved. Important legal consequences follow for each of the former spouses
and the third-party creditor if only one or two of the component debts are preserved while the
other(s) is (are) discharged.
A.

Nondischargeability of the Debtor’s Direct Liability to the Third- Party Creditor

The first component obligation of the bankruptcy debtor in these circumstances is the
underlying contractual liability to the third-party marital creditor. The 1994 legislative history of
§ 523(a)(15) states clearly that the former spouse may not claim this obligation as a
nondischargeable property settlement debt.53 By way of contrast, the legislative history and

53

See H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 55, reprinted in1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364, relied
on in Barstow v. Finaly (In re Finaly), 190 B.R. 312, 315-16 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995)
(“[Section] 523(a)(15) applies only to debts owed to the former spouse. The plaintiff cannot
assert § 523(a)(15) to render nondischargeable a debt owed to a third party.”). An early draft of
§ 523(a)(15) raised the prospect of preserving the bankruptcy debtor’s underlying debt to the
third-party marital creditor, by providing that a debt “assumed or incurred” in connection with
the debtor’s divorce would be eligible for nondischarge. See SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24,
¶ 6.07A[1], at 6-97 to -99 (discussing House of Representatives Report that accompanied the
early draft). The word “assumed” was deleted from the language of the statute as enacted, and

-25statutory language of § 523(a)(5) are silent on this issue.54 Only a handful of judicial opinions
have discussed the potential survivability of the debtor’s underlying contractual liability to the
third-party creditor as a nondischargeable family support debt. As illustrated by the discussion
below of two bankruptcy court cases, In re MacDonald55 and In re Maune,56 the courts
addressing this issue have not reached any uniform result.
Two threshold concerns must be addressed before the bankruptcy debtor’s direct
obligation to the third-party marital creditor, incurred during the debtor’s marriage, can be
considered as a potentially nondischargeable support debt under § 523(a)(5). First, a concern
arises that preserving the debtor’s direct contractual liability may provide an unacceptable
windfall to the third-party creditor, who is not an object of special protection under the familyrelated provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Actually, this same concern also arises in
considering the potential nondischargeability of the other aspects of the debtor’s liability relating
to allocated marital debts—the repayment and hold harmless obligations owed to the former
spouse, discussed below. For example, preserving the bankruptcy debtor’s repayment obligation
to the former spouse probably enhances the likelihood of payment to the third-party creditor by
the debtor, because the debtor’s former spouse remains entitled to coerce such payment. Thus,
preservation of each aspect of the debtor’s liability regarding debts incurred during marriage

the express statement in the House Report excluding the underlying marital debt from such
treatment was added. Id.
54

See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865; H.R.
REP. NO. 95-595, at 364 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6320.
55
56

MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 69 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).

Maune v. Maune (In re Maune), 133 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991), overruled in
part by McKinnis v. McKinnis, 287 B.R. 245 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2002).

-26enhances the likelihood of the third-party creditor receiving payment in spite of the debtor’s
bankruptcy.
However, any benefit flowing to the third-party marital creditor from the determination
that a debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) or (a)(15) must be regarded as a collateral
consequence of implementing the important goal of protecting post-divorce families in
bankruptcy proceedings. The crucial inquiry is whether the debtor’s obligations arising from the
earlier allocation of debts incurred during marriage satisfy the standards for nondischargeability
of family support or property settlement obligations. In determining which aspects of the
debtor’s liability should be preserved in these circumstances, the focus must be on the debtor’s
dependent family members, and not on the third-party marital creditor.57
In considering whether the underlying contractual obligation to the third-party creditor
can itself be considered a potentially nondischargeable family support obligation, a more
difficult threshold concern arises from the language of § 523(a)(5). The statute requires that a
nondischargeable support debt must be a “debt . . . to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record . . . .”58 If this statutory
language is construed to mean that nondischargeable support debts must be incurred by the
debtor at the time of divorce, then the contractual obligations to third-party creditors incurred
during the debtor’s marriage would be excluded from consideration. On the other hand, the joint

57

Notably, courts have recognized other types of debts payable to third-party creditors as
nondischargeable family support debts under § 523(a)(5). For example, as discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 95-97, courts have held that the obligation of the bankruptcy debtor to pay
the divorce attorney’s fee of the former spouse is nondischargeable if the debt is in the nature of
support.
58

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2001) (emphasis added).

-27marital debts may arguably be regarded as debts “for support . . . in connection with a . . .
divorce decree,” because the decree allocates them to the debtor for repayment.59 Thus, there is
no clear answer in the statutory language to the question posed here: whether the bankruptcy
debtor’s contractual liabilities to marital creditors may be regarded as “divorce-related” debts
under § 523(a)(5).60 As with the concern described above about potential windfalls to third-party
creditors, a primary focus on the protection of the family interests supports the broad
construction of statutory language here.
The bankruptcy court in In re Maune61 engaged in this type of broad statutory
construction, and ruled that the bankruptcy debtor’s underlying obligations to third-party marital
creditors constituted nondischargeable support debts. In Maune, the 1989 divorce decree of the
Missouri state court required the husband to “assume responsibility for certain debts of the

59

The language of § 523(a)(15) regarding nondishcargeable property settlement
obligations avoids the type of ambiguity arising under the language of § 523(a)(5) and discussed
in the text. Section 523(a)(15) requires that a nondischargeable debt must be “incurred by the
debtor in the course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation agreement,
divorce decree or other order of a court of record . . . .” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (emphasis
added). The phrase “incurred by the debtor” has been construed to limit § 523(a)(15) to those
debts arising at the time of the debtor’s divorce or separation. See infra text accompanying notes
73-81.
60

The same question has arisen in other situations involving certain types of unilateral
(not joint) obligations of the bankruptcy debtor that pre-dated the debtor’s divorce. For example,
the question has arisen whether obligations incurred by the debtor during marriage for family
support purposes, such as medical bills, can be characterized as “divorce-related” obligations
under § 523(a)(5) in the debtor’s post-divorce bankruptcy. SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24,
¶ 6.03[3], [4]. The various courts considering the eligibility of such pre-divorce debts for
nondischarge have not reached consistent results. See id. (collecting cases).
61

Maune v. Maune (In re Maune), 133 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991), overruled in
part by McKinnis v. McKinnis, 287 B.R. 245, 252 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2002) (ruling that debtor’s
obligation to third-party creditor fails to satisfy the requirement under § 503(a)(5) that
nondischargeable debt must be owed to the debtor’s former spouse “when the debtor is also
obligated to hold his former spouse harmless as to those debts”).

-28marriage on which both [spouses] were liable . . . and . . . to indemnify and hold harmless the
[wife].”62 One year later, the former husband filed a bankruptcy petition, listing on the schedule
of debts “the debts he had assumed in the Dissolution Decree and Settlement Agreement,
including obligations to [the marital creditors].”63 A few months later, with the bankruptcy case
pending, one of the joint marital creditors sued the former wife for payment. This creditor action
apparently motivated the former wife to file a complaint in the debtor’s bankruptcy case, seeking
a declaration of nondischargeability of the debtor’s divorce-related debts under § 523(a)(5).
The Maune court first applied the federal standard for distinguishing nondischargeable
support debts from dischargeable property settlement obligations, and concluded that the
husband’s obligations fell into the former category. Next, the court ruled, as a matter of law, that
the debtor’s underlying debts to the third-party creditors, as well as the obligation to hold his
former spouse harmless as to these debts, could be preserved under § 523(a)(5).64 In doing so,
the court assessed this issue in light of the interests of each party.
First, as to the interests of the bankruptcy debtor, the Maune court stated that “the
discharge of the debts underlying the indemnity agreements [would do] little to further the
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Id. at 1012.

63

Id.

64

The Maune opinion expressly overruled the following cases, as to the issue of
dischargeability of the debtor’s contractual liability to the marital creditor: Lord v. Lord (In re
Lord), 93 B.R. 678, 681 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988); Smith v. Smith (In re Smith), 42 B.R. 628, 631
(Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1984) (“[S]ection (a)(5) . . . does not render non-dischargeable a debt to a third
party itself but only the debtor’s obligation to hold his or her ex-spouse harmless from payment
of this debt . . . .”). The rule of the Maune case was followed in Burns v. Burns (In re Burns),
194 B.R. 578, 582 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993). The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri reversed itself again on this issue in McKinnis v. McKinnis, 287 B.R. 245 (Bankr. E.D.
Mo. 2002), as to cases where a hold harmless obligation exists between the former spouses.

-29Debtor’s fresh start.”65 Here, the court apparently meant that the debtor would remain ultimately
responsible for payment under the hold harmless obligation, even if the underlying obligations to
third-party creditors were discharged. The court failed to acknowledge, however, that the
debtor’s liability under the hold harmless obligation was contingent on his former wife’s
payment of the underlying obligation followed by her affirmative effort to collect reimbursement
from him. By way of contrast, the debtor’s liability under the original loan contract was
immediate and enforceable by the third-party creditor. Thus, the court’s decision to preserve
both the hold harmless debt and the debtor’s original contractual liability had a likely negative
impact on the economic position of the debtor.
The Maune court also justified its decision by focusing on the interests of the bankruptcy
debtor’s former wife. Here, the court emphasized both the unfairness and inconvenience that
would result if only the debtor’s hold harmless obligation to her was preserved. On the subject
of fairness, the court observed that “discharging the Debtor of the [joint marital] obligations he
agreed to satisfy seems unfair to the Debtor’s former spouse who, in essence, negotiated for
secondary liability on those debts.” As to the convenience of the former spouse, the court stated
that “the proposed disposition needlessly inconveniences the Debtor’s former spouse who serves
as a conduit between the Debtor and the third-party creditor.”66 That is if only the debtor’s hold
harmless liability was preserved, the former wife could assert her rights only by paying off the
joint marital itemizations to the third-party creditors, and then suing her former husband for
reimbursement.
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Maune, 133 B.R. at 1012.
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Id. at 1014.

-30Finally, the Maune court assessed the impact of its ruling on the debt collection process.
The court opined that “the contemplated result [of discharging the underlying debts] detracts
from the efficiency of the collection process by directing the creditor to collect from the Debtor’s
former spouse who must then collect from the Debtor.”67 Thus, the court concluded that many
important interests were best served by granting the former spouse’s request for relief. The
bankruptcy court in Maune ruled that the bankruptcy debtor’s joint liability for the debts incurred
during his marriage was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5).
By way of contrast to the decision in the Maune case, the bankruptcy court in the 1986
case of In re MacDonald68 ruled that the bankruptcy debtor’s underlying contractual liability to
third-party marital creditors was not itself a potentially nondischargeable debt. Notably, the
court gave no rationale for its conclusion on this important legal issue.
The MacDonalds’ 1983 property settlement agreement, which had been incorporated by
the divorce court into their divorce decree, provided that the husband must hold his wife
harmless as to two debts incurred by them jointly during marriage. (The divorce decree did not
expressly order the husband to repay the debts.)69 The first marital debt in the MacDonald case
was a loan in the amount of $81,000 used to purchase x-ray equipment when the husband first set
up his medical practice in 1980; the lending bank had also obtained a security interest in the
equipment at that time. The second loan, made to the MacDonalds by a credit union in the
amount of approximately $20,000, was used for ordinary living expenses during the time when
the husband set up his practice.
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Id.
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MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 69 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
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See id. at 262.

-31In spite of the intention of the divorce decree to impose sole responsibility on the former
husband for repayment of these two loans, both were in arrears at the time of his bankruptcy
proceeding. In the bankruptcy court, the former wife “testified that she ha[d] been sued by [the
first lender] for outstanding payments, and that demands ha[d] been made of her by the [second
lender] for overdue payments.”70 Furthermore, sometime after the divorce the former husband
had donated the x-ray equipment, which was the security for the larger loan, and took a
charitable deduction for the donation on his income tax return.
In his bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor listed the hold harmless obligation to his former
wife along with the underlying debts to the third-party creditors, on his schedule of debts. The
former wife filed a complaint in the bankruptcy case, asserting that the debtor’s underlying
obligations to the marital creditors were nondischargeable support obligations. In analyzing her
claim, the MacDonald court first applied § 523(a)(5) to the facts of the case, and concluded that
the arrangement made between the former spouses at the time of the divorce regarding their
marital debts satisfied the federal standard for nondischargeable support obligations. However,
the court refused to grant the former wife’s request for relief by preserving the debtor’s joint
liability to the two third-party creditors. The court ruled as a matter of law that only the hold
harmless debt to the former spouse could be preserved under § 523(a)(5), as follows:
The court notes that there are two distinct obligations involved in an agreement to
assume former joint marital debts: (1) the underlying debt owed to the mutual
creditor, and (2) the obligation owed directly to the former spouse to hold the
spouse harmless on that underlying debt. . . . It is the dischargeability of the latter
obligation that is at issue in this case. The debtor’s obligation to pay his various
70

Id. at 265.

-32other creditors, those creditors in respect of whose debts he promised to pay and
to indemnify and hold the plaintiff harmless, are discharged by his discharge in
bankruptcy. The debtor’s obligation to the plaintiff and their children has not
been discharged. Thus the debtor is required to reimburse or to indemnify and
hold plaintiff harmless only to the extent that the plaintiff is actually required to
make payment to [the two named creditors].71
Clearly, the support-related interests of the former wife in MacDonald would have been
better protected by the remedy she requested. Specifically, the nondischarge of the bankruptcy
debtor’s underlying contractual obligations would have preserved the rights of the third-party
creditors to seek repayment from either former spouse. In MacDonald, the former husband
continued in his profession as an orthopedic surgeon, while the former wife had no significant
employment history, and was unemployed and without significant assets at the time of the
bankruptcy case. Following the former husband’s discharge of the underlying debts in
bankruptcy, however, the lenders could pursue only the former wife for collection of the
delinquent marital debts. The only protection extended to her under the MacDonald ruling was
the right to sue her husband for reimbursement, in the event that she paid off the creditors.
The bankruptcy court opinions in the MacDonald and Maune cases reached inconsistent
results on the legal question of the potential survivability of the bankruptcy debtor’s personal
liability to pre-divorce marital creditors under § 523(a)(5). No appellate court has addressed this
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Id. at 278 (citations omitted). Accord Krein v. Hanagan (In re Krein), 230 B.R. 379
(Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1999); Reeder v. Ziegler (In re Ziegler), No. 94-61854, 1995 WL 512197
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio, Aug. 9, 1995). Congress cited the MacDonald case in the legislative history
of § 523(a)(15) to support the proposition that the underlying debt to the marital creditor cannot
be the subject of a determination of nondischargeability in cases involving property settlements.
See H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364.

-33issue. And in most reported cases involving allocated marital debts, the issue has not been raised
by the parties or addressed by the court.
The likely explanation for this lack of attention to the bankruptcy debtor’s underlying
contractual liability to third-party creditors for the debts incurred during marriage involves the
complexity of the debtor’s financial situation in cases where such marital debts were allocated to
the debtor by the divorce court. As described at length in this Article, the debtor in this situation
owes more than one debt relating to the same subject matter. The parties, their lawyers and the
courts may not appreciate that the former spouse’s claim of nondischargeability could potentially
be extended to several discrete debts. The hold harmless provision or repayment clause included
in the parties’ separation agreement or divorce decree may be the most obvious aspect of the
debtor’s divorce-related liability, and the analysis of the debtor’s continuing liability under
§ 523(a)(5) may begin and end with the consideration of it. However, the failure to identify the
debtor’s underlying contractual liability to third parties as potentially nondischargeable debts
forecloses the type of inquiry made in the Maune case as to whether preservation of the thirdparty claims would serve the family support purpose of § 523(a)(5). Failure to address the status
of this additional aspect of the debtor’s liability, as in the MacDonald case, unnecessarily limits
the forms of relief available to the bankruptcy debtor’s dependent family members under the
Bankruptcy Code.
B.

Nondischargeability of the Debtor’s Obligation to the Former Spouse to Repay
the Third-Party Debts Incurred During Marriage

Just like the debtor’s personal liability to third-party marital creditors, discussed in the
last Subsection, the obligation arising under a divorce court order requiring the debtor to repay
the debts incurred during marriage is frequently ignored in post-divorce bankruptcy litigation.
The Maune case, discussed in the last Subsection, illustrates the tendency to ignore this

-34additional obligation as a potentially nondischargeable debt of the bankruptcy debtor. According
to the bankruptcy court in Maune, the debtor’s divorce decree expressly ordered him to repay
certain joint marital debts, and to hold his former wife harmless as to these obligations.72 The
dual requirement here created two distinct obligations between the former spouses. In the former
husband’s bankruptcy proceeding, however, the parties and the court ignored the repayment
obligation, focusing instead on the court-ordered duty to hold the nondebtor spouse harmless,
along with the underlying joint obligation to the marital creditors.
The failure to consider the bankruptcy debtor’s repayment obligation as a potentially
nondischargeable debt has ramifications for both the debtor’s former spouse and the third-party
creditors. From the perspective of the former spouse, preservation of this obligation continues
his or her right to directly enforce the provision of the divorce decree shifting full responsibility
for marital debts to the debtor. In the event that the debtor defaults on repaying the creditors, the
former spouse can ask the divorce court to hold the debtor in contempt of court until payment is
made, or pursue other state court enforcement remedies. This option involves more direct
control on the part of the former spouse to protect his or her own financial interests than a court
order preserving only the debtor’s hold harmless obligation. From the creditors’ perspective,
preservation of the repayment obligation between the former spouses involves no direct
enforcement rights for the third-party creditors. Nevertheless, the creditors’ chances of being
repaid by the bankruptcy debtor are enhanced by the former spouse’s continuing right to coerce
payment from the debtor.
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Maune v. Maune (In re Maune), 133 B.R. 1010, 1012 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991),
overruled in part by McKinnis v. McKinnis, 287 B.R. 245, 252 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2002) (ruling
that debtor’s obligation to third- party creditor fails to satisfy the requirement under § 503(a)(5)
that nondischargeable debt must be owed to the debtor’s former spouse “when the debtor is also
obligated to hold his former spouse harmless as to those debts”).

-35Many of the reported cases involving repayment obligations established by the
bankruptcy debtor’s divorce decree have arisen under § 523(a)(15). Here, the availability of the
former spouse’s claim of nondischargeability depends upon the judicial construction of specific
statutory language. Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(15) sets out a threshold requirement that
nondischargeable property settlement obligations must have been “incurred by the debtor in the
course of a divorce or separation or in connection with a separation agreement [or] divorce
decree.”73 There is no consensus among the judicial opinions that have considered whether, as a
matter of law, the repayment order in a debtor’s separation agreement or divorce decree satisfies
this statutory requirement. The bankruptcy court opinion in Burton v. Burton74 and the opinion
of the bankruptcy appeals panel in Gibson v. Gibson75 illustrate the conflict.
In Burton, the Missouri divorce court ordered the former husband to repay a mortgage
loan on which the former spouses were jointly liable, but the divorce decree did not include a
hold harmless provision. In the former husband’s subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, his former
wife asserted that the repayment obligation constituted a nondischargeable property settlement
debt under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(15). She did not make a claim under § 523(a)(5).76
The bankruptcy court in Burton expressed the opinion that the repayment order in the
debtor’s divorce decree provided no basis for a claim of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(15),
because it was not a debt “incurred . . . in the course of [the debtor’s] divorce,” as required by the
statutory language quoted above. According to the Burton court,
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See Burton, 242 B.R. at 677.

-36[Section (a)(15)] require[s] the creation of a debt in the course of a divorce or
separation that was not in existence before the divorce. . . . A hold harmless or
indemnification agreement in the divorce decree will usually meet this
requirement. Conversely, in the absence of a hold harmless agreement,
§ 523(a)(15) is inapplicable to joint debts that were incurred by the Debtor prior
to the divorce proceeding.77
The Burton court believed that no new debt was created, because the former husband had been
obligated to pay the mortgage lender under the original loan agreement, and was also required to
pay the same lender under the divorce court’s repayment order. Here, the court failed to consider
that the debtor’s obligation under the repayment order was owed to, and enforceable by, the
former spouse rather than the third-party creditor. As a result, the court did not recognize the
new and substantial obligation established under the divorce decree.
The Burton court failed to identify and assign significance to the discrete, component
obligations of the bankruptcy debtor to whom debts incurred during marriage were allocated in a
pre-bankruptcy divorce proceeding. As in the MacDonald case,78 discussed in the last

77

Id. at 678 (citations omitted). Accord Stegall v. Stegall (In re Stegall), 188 B.R. 597
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995). The underlying debt in the Burton case was a mortgage on the family
home for which the former spouses were jointly liable. The divorce decree had awarded the
house to the former husband “subject to” the outstanding mortgage, and the Burton court
observed that “the [divorce decree did] not even contain a specific statement that the Debtor was
to assume . . . the debt.” Id. It is quite clear under the court’s holding, however, that the result
would have been the same if the divorce decree had included such an explicit statement about the
former husband’s responsibility to repay the joint marital debt.
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MacDonald v. MacDonald (In re MacDonald), 69 B.R. 259 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986),
discussed supra at text accompanying notes 68-71. The debts in MacDonald were the
bankruptcy debtor’s underlying obligations to marital creditors, and the responsibility to hold his
former wife harmless as to these marital debts. In the adversary proceeding initiated by the
debtor’s former spouse under § 523(a)(5), the MacDonald court refused to consider the
underlying obligations as potentially nondischargeable debts.

-37Subsection, the failure to separately consider each aspect of the debtor’s liability relating to
allocated marital debts automatically closed off the corresponding avenues of relief for the
debtor’s family members under § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Burton court’s denial that
the debtor’s repayment obligation to the former spouse was a debt separate from his underlying
obligation to the third-party marital creditor had dramatic consequences for the former spouse.
In the words of the bankruptcy court, “[t]he unfortunate but unavoidable result of this
determination is that, in the event there is a deficiency (which there will likely be) when [the
creditor] forecloses on the property securing the debt (scheduled to occur [on a date certain]),
[the former spouse] will be solely liable for the deficiency.”79
In Gibson v. Gibson,80 the Bankruptcy Appeals Panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals provided a different answer to the same legal question, whether the repayment order in a
divorce decree created a new debt, as required for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(15). By
recognizing the multiple aspects of the bankruptcy debtor’s liability, the Gibson court preserved
the possibility of relief for the former spouse in the event that the other elements of
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(15) could be established as to the debtor’s repayment
obligation.
In Gibson, the Ohio divorce court ordered the former husband to repay a debt to his
stepfather, which the divorcing couple had incurred jointly during their marriage. As in Burton,
there was no hold harmless clause. During the former husband’s subsequent bankruptcy
proceeding, the former wife claimed that the debtor’s obligation to repay his stepfather was
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Gibson v. Gibson (In re Gibson), 219 B.R. 195 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998).

-38nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5) or § 523(a)(15). At that time, the stepfather had already
initiated a lawsuit to collect the debt from her.
The bankruptcy court in Gibson entered a summary judgment order in favor of the
debtor, ruling that his repayment obligation under the divorce decree was dischargeable. First, as
to the former wife’s claim under § 523(a)(5), the court ruled that there was no evidence in the
pleadings that the husband’s repayment obligation was “in the nature of support.” On appeal, the
Bankruptcy Panel of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this portion of the summary
judgment. As to the former wife’s second claim, that the debt was a nondischargeable property
settlement under § 523(a)(15), the lower court held that the debt created by the repayment clause
of the divorce decree was not a debt “incurred by the debtor in the course of a divorce” as
required by § 523(a)(15). Here, the bankruptcy court emphasized that the debtor and his wife
were both obligated to his stepfather under the original loan note prior to the time of divorce, and
concluded therefore that the debtor incurred no new debt under the repayment clause of the
divorce decree. This is the same analysis employed by the bankruptcy court in the Burton case,
described above. On this issue, the appellate court in Gibson reversed the summary judgment
order and remanded the case for trial.
The Sixth Circuit appellate panel in Gibson ruled that a new debt had been created by the
repayment order in the bankruptcy debtor’s divorce decree, which was distinct from his
preexisting joint liability to his stepfather. Namely, the repayment order had created an
obligation to the debtor’s former wife, which was enforceable by her in state court in the event of
the debtor’s default.81 This obligation would be nondischargeable if, on remand, the bankruptcy
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Id. at 204. Accord Crawford v. Osborne (In re Osborne), 262 B.R. 435 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 2001) (overruling LaRue v. McCracken (In re LaRue), 204 B.R. 531 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.

-39court balanced the factors under the § 523(a)(15) standard in favor of the former wife. In that
event, the bankruptcy debtor would continue to owe the duty to his former wife to repay the debt,
even though his underlying contractual liability to his stepfather was discharged in bankruptcy.
The divorce decrees in Burton and Gibson included repayment orders, but no hold
harmless provisions. In other cases, the dischargeability of a repayment order has been assessed
along side the hold harmless clause included in the same divorce decree. The 1995 South
Dakota state court case of Hogie v. Hogie,82 which involved the support exception to discharge
in bankruptcy, illustrates this category of cases.
The divorce decree in the Hogie case required the former husband to “assume and pay for
all indebtedness concerning the accounts with the Firstline Account, the Visa charge card, and
the Discover charge card, and . . . hold [the former wife] harmless from collection of any
amounts due on said accounts.”83 When the former husband subsequently stopped making
payments on these debts and filed for bankruptcy, the creditors approached the former wife for
payment. In response to these events, the former wife sued in state court to enforce the
provisions of the divorce decree. The trial court in South Dakota ruled that both the repayment
obligation and the hold harmless obligation established in the bankruptcy debtor’s divorce decree

1997)); Johnston v. Henson (In re Henson), 197 B.R. 299 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996). See also
Hazelton v. Hazelton, (In re Hazelton) 2003 Bankr. LEXIS 1831 (Bankr. M.D. Pa., Aug. 1,
2003) (ruling that hold harmless debt was a new obligation under § 523(a)(15) incurred in the
debtor’s divorce proceeding).
82

Hogie v. Hogie, 527 N.W.2d 915 (S.D. 1995).
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Id. at 918.

-40were nondischargeable family support debts under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(5).84 This ruling,
which allowed the former wife to enforce the debtor’s obligations to her, in spite of his
bankruptcy, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Hogie.
The South Dakota high court in Hogie recognized the bankruptcy debtor’s repayment
obligation and the hold harmless obligation as two distinct debts, even though both had been
created in the same instrument and related to the same subject matter. At the time of the state
court enforcement proceeding, initiated by the former wife in Hogie, the hold harmless
obligation was not immediately enforceable, because the former wife had not made any
payments to the credit care companies. In these circumstances, the court’s recognition of the
former husband’s repayment obligation as a separate, nondischargeable support debt under
§ 523(a)(5) entitled the former wife to enforce his obligation to make current payments to the
credit care lenders.
C.

Limitation of Nondischargeability to the Debtor’s Hold Harmless Obligation to
the Former Spouse

The analysis in many cases involving marital debts allocated to the divorced bankruptcy
debtor has focused on the debtor’s hold harmless obligation to the former spouse.85 Often, there
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The Hogie court acted pursuant to provisions in the Bankruptcy Code, discussed infra at
text accompanying notes 107-10, which confer concurrent jurisdiction on the state courts to
make determinations about the dischargeability of divorce-related debts under § 523(a)(5).
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The legislative histories of §§ 523(a)(5) and 523(a)(15) also emphasized the bankruptcy
debtor’s hold harmless debts in cases where pre-divorce marital obligations have been allocated
by the divorce court to the bankruptcy debtor. Thus, the 1994 House of Representatives Report
regarding the exception from discharge for certain property settlement obligations under
§ 523(a)(15) expressly referred to the potential nondischargeability of hold harmless obligations.
See H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 55, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3364, discussed in
Miles, supra note 45, at 1180-82. Furthermore, the House Report stated that any judicial ruling
of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(15) may not be extended to the debtor’s contractual
liability to the third-party creditor. H.R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 55. There was no express
reference to the third obligation that may arise in these circumstances, the debtor’s obligation to

-41is no consideration of either the debtor’s pre-divorce, direct liability to the third-party creditors
or the debtor’s obligation to the former spouse under the divorce decree to assume sole
responsibility for repayment of the marital debts. Silence as to these related obligations has led
to the (unspoken) conclusion that they are automatically discharged in bankruptcy. Often, it
appears that the parties in their pleadings have ignored these additional obligations of the
bankruptcy debtor relating to allocated marital debts. And, generally speaking, the courts have
not expanded their analysis beyond the limited formulation of the dischargeability issue in the
parties’ pleadings, focusing exclusively on the debtor’s hold harmless obligation to the former
spouse.
For example, in In re Edwards,86 the bankruptcy debtor’s divorce decree ordered him to
repay several marital debts and to hold his former wife harmless, as follows:
[The debtor] shall be responsible for the payment of [the marital debts] . . . . [He]
shall indemnify and hold harmless the [former wife] from any liability for these
obligations. This order is made for the purpose of freeing the [former wife] of her
liability as to these past obligations so that she may properly care for herself.87

the former spouse under their divorce decree to be solely responsible for repayment to the thirdparty marital creditors.
As to family support debts, the legislative history of § 523(a)(5) stated that Congress
intended to include hold harmless obligations between former spouses within the scope of the
exception from discharge. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 79 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5865; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 364 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6320. But no reference appears in either the statute or the legislative history of § 523(a)(5)
to the two additional obligations involved in the allocation of responsibility for marital debts to
the bankruptcy debtor at the time of divorce.
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-42In the debtor’s post-divorce bankruptcy proceeding, his former wife sought “a determination that
the defendant’s obligation . . . to hold the [former wife] harmless from certain liabilities (the
Obligation) was not dischargeable because it was actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance,
or support within the meaning of § 523(a)(5)(B).”88 The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the
debtor’s former wife on this issue, holding that “the Obligation is not dischargeable under
§ 523(a)(5).”89 Notably, neither the former wife in her pleadings nor the bankruptcy court in its
opinion in Edwards raised the possibility of preserving the debtor’s obligation to the former wife
to repay the marital debts or the debtor’s underlying contractual liability to the marital creditors.
As illustrated by the Edwards case, an exclusive focus on the debtor’s hold harmless
obligation forecloses any consideration of the debtor’s other obligations as potentially
nondischargeable support debts. The practical effect of the limitation is best illustrated in cases
where the debtor’s former spouse is denied any remedy until he or she actually pays off the
marital debts and thereby becomes entitled to reimbursement under the hold harmless provision.
The financial impact of this limitation for the former spouse was described by the dissenting
judge in the Kentucky Court of Appeals case of McDonald v. McDonald, as follows:
While it is true that [the debtor’s former wife] is not yet the subject of collection
procedures, it is equally apparent that she is obligated to [the third-party creditor]
and recognizes that obligation. When one considers this sizeable debt and
commensurate interest charges coupled with the probable costs of collection, the
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Id.
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Id. at 525.

-43majority has placed [her], a person with limited financial resources, in a legal
limbo.90
In both the Edwards and McDonald cases, a threshold judicial determination was made
that the debtor’s former spouse had satisfied the Bankruptcy Code standard for identifying
nondischargeable family support obligations under § 523(a)(5). Clearly, then, the debtor’s
former spouse was a person intended by Congress to receive economic protection under the
Bankruptcy Code. The failure to recognize the several component obligations of the debtor
relating to allocated marital debts in these cases unnecessarily limited the protection available for
the bankruptcy debtor’s former spouse. Consideration of the debtor’s repayment obligation to
the former spouse, along with the hold harmless obligation, would afford greater protection to
the debtor’s dependent family members in these circumstances.
D.

Standing of the Third-Party Creditor

The issues raised above in the Maune,91 Gibson92 and Hogie93 cases, regarding debtors to
whom marital debts were allocated for repayment in pre-bankruptcy divorce proceedings, lead to
a related question. Namely, do the third-party creditors of the marriage have standing to assert
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Maune v. Maune (In re Maune), 133 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991), overruled in
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accompanying notes 61-67, 72.
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notes 82-84.

-44the nondischargeability of the debtor’s obligations under §§ 523(a)(5) or (a)(15)?94 In Maune,
the bankruptcy court refused to discharge the direct contractual liability of the bankruptcy debtor
to third-party marital creditors. In Gibson and Hogie, the courts preserved the bankruptcy
debtors’ divorce court-imposed obligations to their former spouses to repay the debts incurred
jointly during marriage. In Maune, Gibson and Hogie, the question of nondischargeability was
raised by the bankruptcy debtors’ former spouses. The related issue posed here is whether the
third-party marital creditor would also have standing to assert the nondischargeability of these
divorce-related obligations of the bankruptcy debtor under § 523(a)(5) or (a)(15). The question
would arise if, for some reason, the debtor’s former spouse did not act to raise the issue of
nondischargeability in the debtor’s bankruptcy case. To date, there are no reported cases
addressing this precise question.
If raised, the question of third-party creditor standing would likely be answered
differently in cases arising under the two Bankruptcy Code provisions creating exceptions from
discharge for divorce-related obligations. The creditor is unlikely to be granted standing under
§ 523(a)(15), which governs the dischargeability of divorce-related property settlement
obligations, because the legislative history expressly states that third-party marital creditors have
no standing to assert such claims. The 1994 House of Representatives Report regarding
§ 523(a)(15) states that “the exception [to discharge for certain property settlement obligations]
. . . can be asserted only by the other party to the divorce or separation. If the debtor agrees to
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For a general discussion of the standing doctrine in civil litigation, see FRIEDENTHAL ET
AL., supra note 15, § 6.3.

-45pay marital debts that were owed to third parties, those third parties do not have standing to
assert this exception . . . .”95
While the legislative history is not binding on the courts in the same manner as the
statutory language itself,96 the courts have generally been deferential to the clear intent expressed
in this Report in cases involving other types of third-party creditors. For example, in cases
involving divorce-related attorney fees payable by the bankruptcy debtor for legal services
provided to the debtor’s former spouse, most courts have held that the attorney creditor does not
have standing to raise the issue of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(15).97 According to the
judicial opinions in these cases, which frequently rely upon the legislative history quoted above,
the claim that the attorney fee obligation is a nondischargeable property settlement debt can be
asserted only by the former spouse. Predictably, the courts would be similarly deferential to the
limitation on third-party standing expressed in the House of Representatives Report in cases
involving a pre-divorce obligation allocated to the bankruptcy debtor for repayment at the time
of divorce. This, of course, is the situation expressly anticipated by the drafters of the House
Report in the language quoted above.
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96

See generally CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD AND WRITING 33 (3d ed. 1998)
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See Ashton v. Dollaga (In re Dollaga), 260 B.R. 493 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2001); Abate v.
Beach (In re Beach), 203 B.R. 676 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997); Woloshin v. Harris (In re Harris),
203 B.R. 558 (Bankr. D. Del. 1996); STEINFELD & STEINFELD, supra note 31, at 8, 41 n.127
(collecting cases). But see Zimmerman v. Soderlund (In re Soderlund), 197 B.R. 742 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1996) (allowing attorney to raise claim of nondischargeability of attorney fees under
§ 523(a)(15)).

-46As to claims of nondischargeability for family support obligations under § 523(a)(5),
neither the language of the Bankruptcy Code nor the legislative history addresses the question of
third-party creditor standing. To date, no reported cases have addressed the question in the
context of pre-existing marital obligations that were allocated by the divorce court to the
bankruptcy debtor.98 The question of third-party creditor standing under § 523(a)(5) has arisen,
like the counterpart issue under § 523(a)(15), in attorney fee cases. Contrary to the results in the
property settlement cases, described above, many courts have granted the attorney creditor
standing to assert support claims under § 523(a)(5). The attorney, along with the former spouse,
is thereby entitled to raise the question whether the bankruptcy debtor’s obligation to pay
attorney fees for representation of the former spouse in the parties’ divorce proceeding
constitutes a nondischargeable family support debt under § 523(a)(5).99
For example, in Will v. Saxton,100 the bankruptcy court affirmed an attorney’s standing to
assert such a claim under § 523(a)(5), stating: “We view [the bankruptcy debtor’s] undertaking
to pay his wife’s legal fees as a paradigmatic third party beneficiary contract . . . . In a third
party beneficiary contract, benefits flow to both the promisee and the third party, and either may
sue to enforce the contract.”101 Thus, absent the type of constraint imposed by the legislative
history of § 523(a)(15), the third-party creditor was permitted to raise the question whether the
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1981) (accepting without discussion the standing of a marital creditor who claimed that the
bankruptcy debtor’s divorce-related obligation to repay marital debts constituted a
nondischargeable support debt under § 523(a)(5)).
99

See SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 6.05(5) (summarizing case law).

100

Will v. Saxton (In re Will), 116 B.R. 254 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990).

101

Id. at 255 (quoting Pauley v. Spong (In re Spong), 661 F.2d 6, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1981)).

-47family-related purposes of § 523(a)(5) would be served by a judicial determination of
nondischargeability.
Predictably, the same analysis would yield an affirmative answer to the question of thirdparty creditor standing under § 523(a)(5), in the situation where the creditor was a pre-divorce
marital creditor whose claim was the subject of a repayment order in the debtor’s divorce decree.
Under this analysis, if the debtor’s divorce decree ordered the debtor to assume exclusive
responsibility for repaying a pre-divorce marital debt, the marital creditor would have standing to
assert the nondischargeability of the resulting repayment obligation owed by the debtor to the
former spouse. Furthermore, in a jurisdiction that has adopted the rule of the Maune case,102
discussed above, the question of third-party creditor standing could arise as well as to the
debtor’s direct, contractual obligation to the creditor.103 The issue of third-party creditor
standing would arise if a creditor, aware of the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding, believed that its
interests were not well represented by the former spouse, perhaps because the former spouse
failed to raise the issue of dischargeability under § 523(a)(5).
Allowing the third-party creditor to act to protect its interests in this manner would confer
a privilege on the marital creditor not generally available to other creditors of the bankruptcy
debtor. As in the related cases involving divorce attorneys, however, the resulting benefit to the
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See Maune v. Maune (In re Maune), 133 B.R. 1010 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991), overruled
in part by McKinnis v. McKinnis, 287 B.R. 245 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2002), discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 61-67.
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The analysis in the text, regarding the potential standing of third-party creditors to
assert claims of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(5) as to marital debts allocated in divorce
proceedings to the bankruptcy debtor, would not extend to the debtor’s obligation to hold the
former spouse harmless. Here, the benefit derived by the third-party creditor from a ruling of
nondischargeability is de minimis, and would not justify the allowance of standing. See
generally SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24, § 6.07[3], at 6-95 (making a similar observation in the
context of a more general discussion of third-party standing under § 523(a)(5)).

-48third-party creditor would be a secondary effect flowing from the protection of family-related
interests under § 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code.
IV.

ADDITIONAL COMPLICATIONS ARISING UNDER § 523(a)(5) DUE TO
CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF THE STATE COURTS AND THE TIMING
OF CLAIMS
Under the Bankruptcy Code, divorce-related family support debts do not, as a theoretical

matter, require a judicial pronouncement to make them nondischargeable.104 As a practical
matter, however, if dischargeability as to a particular debt is contested, a judicial determination is
required to resolve the dispute. Under the Bankruptcy Code, “[t]he issue of discharge of a
section 523(a)(5) debt is never finalized unless some party litigates the issue in a court of
competent jurisdiction.”105 Thus, if the issue is not resolved during the debtor’s bankruptcy
proceeding, a general order of discharge at the close of the case does not affect the debtor’s
divorce-related support obligations. In these circumstances, both the bankruptcy debtor and the
former spouse retain the right to raise the issue of dischargeability under § 523(a)(5) even after
the close of the bankruptcy case.106 Furthermore, claims relating to family support debts under
§ 523(a)(5) can be raised either in bankruptcy court or in the state court with jurisdiction over
family matters.107
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STEINFELD & STEINFELD, supra note 31, at 4.
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In re Crawford, 183 B.R. 103, 106 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1995) (citing Fed. R. Bankr. P.
4007 (1990) (advisory committee note)).
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See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007. The same allowance for delayed determinations of
nondischargeability is extended to other types of debts listed in Bankruptcy Code § 523,
including certain tax obligations. Id.
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See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007. See also 4 COLLIER, supra note 31, ¶ 523.03 at 523-17
(discussing concurrent jurisdiction of state courts and federal bankruptcy courts).

-49These issues of timing and jurisdiction are governed by Rule 4007 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, which is entitled “Determination of Dischargeability of a Debt.” Rule
4007 provides:
(a) Persons Entitled To File Complaint. A debtor or any creditor may file a
complaint with the court to obtain a determination of the dischargeability of any
debt.
(b) Time for Commencing Proceeding [for certain claims, including those arising
under § 523(a)(5)]. A complaint . . . may be filed at any time.108
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4007 explains that “[s]ubdivision (b) does not contain a
time limit for filing a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a type of debt listed as
nondischargeable under § 523(a) . . . (5) . . . . Jurisdiction over this issue on these debts is held
concurrently by the bankruptcy court and any appropriate nonbankruptcy forum.”109 The Rhode
Island Supreme Court summarized the provisions of Rule 4007 and the accompanying Note, as
they apply to family support debts, as follows: “[C]ontests to dischargeability [can] be brought
in either an appropriate state court or in the bankruptcy court, and [can] be brought before or
after a discharge has been granted to the debtor.”110
By way of contrast, the bankruptcy rules governing claims that property settlement debts
are nondischargeable under § 523(a)(15) are less lenient. Such claims must be raised in the
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Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007.
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Id. advisory committee note.
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Hopkins v. Hopkins, 487 A.2d 500, 503 (R.I. 1985) (citing Aldrich v. Imbrogno (In re
Aldrich), 34 B.R. 776, 780 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983)).

-50bankruptcy court, in a timely fashion before the close of the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding.111
These stricter procedural rules follow from the basic theoretical premise that property settlement
obligations, unlike family support debts, are not characterized as nondischargeable absent a
contrary judicial ruling.
Not surprisingly, the analysis of support claims relating to marital obligations allocated in
the bankruptcy debtor’s pre-bankruptcy divorce proceeding becomes more complicated, if the
claims are made after the close of the debtor’s bankruptcy case. Special issues relating to the
timing of claims of nondischargeability in these circumstances are discussed below in Subsection
A. Furthermore, additional complications may arise when the delayed determination of
dischargeability is made in a state court forum, where additional financial remedies between the
former spouses may be available under state law. The interaction of the relevant state and
federal law doctrines in these circumstances is discussed below in Subsection B.
A.

The Timing Factor

The lenient rule governing the timing of § 523(a)(5) claims, embodied in Bankruptcy
Rule 4007 and set out above, is based on the provisions of Bankruptcy Code § 523(c)(1).
Section 523(c)(1) lists certain types of dischargeability claims that are waived by the creditor if
they are not raised in a timely fashion before the debtor’s bankruptcy case is closed.112 Claims
involving the dischargeability of family support obligations under § 523(a)(5) are not included
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Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007 advisory committee note. See also Carey v. Carey, 733 N.E.2d
14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing trial court determination of nondischargeability of debtor’s
property settlement obligation, on the ground that state court lacked jurisdiction under
§ 523(a)(15)); Margaret Howard, A Bankruptcy Primer for the Family Lawyer, 31 FAM. L.Q.
377, 392 (1997) (discussing exclusive bankruptcy court jurisdiction under § 523(a)(15)); Vance,
supra note 23, at 369 (same).
112

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) (2000) (excluding § 523(a)(5) support debts from statutory
list of debts automatically discharged in bankruptcy).

-51on the list. Therefore, a general order of the bankruptcy court discharging the debtor’s
obligations does not affect the debtor’s divorce-related support obligations, if no judicial
determination was made about their dischargeability.
In these circumstances, either the bankruptcy debtor or the former spouse is entitled to a
post-bankruptcy ruling regarding the status of divorce-related debts under § 523(a)(5). The issue
may arise in various procedural contexts following the close of the debtor’s bankruptcy case.
For example, the debtor may assert dischargeability in bankruptcy as a defense to enforcement of
the debtor’s divorce-related obligations by the former spouse in state court.113 In the alternative,
the debtor may bring an action in bankruptcy court, alleging that the former spouse’s efforts to
enforce divorce-related debts in state court violate the bankruptcy court’s earlier discharge order,
and the former spouse may respond by claiming that the debts are nondischargeable support
obligations.114
The rights of the bankruptcy debtor and the former spouse to raise issues relating to the
dischargeability of divorce-related support debts in this manner may appear to be inconsistent
with general principles governing the timing of claims in civil litigation. Absent the special
bankruptcy rule permitting delayed claims, general rules of civil procedure could likely bar the
former spouse from seeking a post-bankruptcy declaration of nondischargeability. Generally
speaking, an interested party with notice of a court proceeding and the opportunity to be heard
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See, e.g., McCarthy v. McCarthy, No. FA 93-0343580, 1995 WL 684831 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1995), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 126-27; Bauer v. Bauer (In
re Marriage of Bauer), 605 P.2d 750 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
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See, e.g., Brabham v. Brabham (In re Brabham), 184 B.R. 476 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995),
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 158-63.

-52therein is foreclosed from raising any issue following the close of the case which could have
been raised during its pendency.115
In the normal course of a bankruptcy proceeding, the debtor submits a schedule of debts
listing creditors and the debts to be discharged in bankruptcy.116 The bankruptcy court then
notifies each listed creditor about the bankruptcy proceeding. Thereafter, the creditor may seek a
judicial determination about the dischargeability of debts, by initiating a so-called adversary
proceeding in bankruptcy court.117 Thus, if the bankruptcy debtor lists the former spouse as a
creditor on the schedule of debts, the former spouse will receive notice of the bankruptcy
proceeding and will have the opportunity to assert claims. In these circumstances, the special
rule permitting the former spouse to assert the nondischargeability of support debts under
§ 523(a)(5) after the close of the bankruptcy case effectively creates an exception to the general
rule of finality in litigation.
Unfortunately, the courts have sometimes failed to recognize and apply this exception to
the principle of finality, established under the Bankruptcy Code for determinations about the
dischargeability of family support debts. For example, in White v. White,118 the divorced
bankruptcy debtor listed a divorce-related hold harmless obligation to his former wife on his
schedule of debts in bankruptcy. The former wife, who received formal notice of the bankruptcy
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18 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE chs. 130-132 (3d ed. 1997).

116

See 1 COLLIER, supra note 31, § 103[2][6] (discussing Bankruptcy Code § 521 and
Bankruptcy Rule 1007, which set out the substantive and procedural requirements for filing the
schedule of debts).
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See 1 GINSBERG & MARTIN, supra note 33, § 11.07[c] (discussing adversary
proceedings initiated by creditors to assert the nondischargeability of debts).
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White v. White, 666 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).

-53proceeding, did not make any claim about the dischargeability of the hold harmless debt in the
debtor’s bankruptcy case. Following the debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy and the close of his
bankruptcy case, the former wife paid the third-party marital debts which were the subject of the
divorce court’s hold harmless order. She then asked the state family court to hold her former
husband in contempt of the hold harmless order, which required him to reimburse her in these
circumstances. In White, the Indiana Court of Appeals ruled that the former wife had waived this
claim by not raising it in the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding. In the words of the court, “the
husband here scheduled his potential hold harmless liability to the wife [in his bankruptcy
proceeding] and thereby secured a discharge of his personal liability to her.”119 In this manner,
the court improperly denied the former wife’s right, established under the Bankruptcy Code, to
seek a delayed ruling about the survivability of the debtor’s hold harmless obligation as a family
support debt.120
In White v. White, the bankruptcy debtor’s inclusion of his divorce-related hold harmless
obligation on the schedule of debts in bankruptcy led the Indiana Court of Appeals to mistakenly
deny his former spouse’s right to a subsequent determination as to nondischargeability of the
debt. Conversely, the bankruptcy debtor’s failure to list divorce- related debts may also lead to
analytical confusion, in light of the rule permitting post-bankruptcy judicial determinations about
the dischargeability of divorce-related support obligations. The general principle of litigation
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Id. at 460.

Notably, after ruling that the debtor’s obligation to reimburse his former wife for
payment of their marital debts had been discharged in bankruptcy, the White court fashioned a
different financial remedy for her. The court ruled that the former wife would no longer be
required to transfer her interest in certain jointly owned real estate, as required by their divorce
decree. According to the court, the wife’s obligation to transfer title to the husband had been
contingent on his payment of the marital debts. White, 666 N.E.2d at 461.

-54which must be considered here provides that a person without notice of a judicial proceeding
cannot be adversely affected by it.121 This general principle is reflected in § 523(a)(3) of the
Bankruptcy Code,122 which establishes an exception from discharge for certain debts not listed
on the schedule of debts if the creditor had no actual notice of the bankruptcy proceeding.
Section 523(a)(3) does not apply to the bankruptcy debtor’s divorce-related support obligations
to a former spouse, however, because the close of the debtor’s bankruptcy case is not “final” in
terms of the former spouse’s potential support claim. As a result, a former spouse may in some
cases be barred from enforcing divorce-related obligations of the bankruptcy debtor, even though
the former spouse had no notice of the bankruptcy case.
Like the general principle of civil litigation upon which it is based, § 523(a)(3) is
designed to avoid prejudice to innocent parties resulting from their failure to receive notice and
an opportunity to participate in judicial proceedings that might affect their interests. Thus,
§ 523(a)(3) preserves debts for which claims of nondischargeability can only be made during the
pendency of the bankruptcy case, such as claims that property settlement obligations are
nondischargeable under § 523(a)(15), “unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the
case in time [to request a determination of nondischargeability during the bankruptcy
proceeding].”123
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See generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 15, § 14.13 (discussing constitutional
requirements regarding notice and opportunity to be heard).
122
123

See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3) (2001).

Id. In Merritt v. Merritt, 693 N.E.2d 1320 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), the court ruled that the
notice requirement of § 523(a)(3) was met, because the bankruptcy debtor’s former wife had
actual notice of his bankruptcy. As a result, the debtor’s hold harmless obligation, which was
characterized by the court as a dischargeable property settlement debt under § 523(a)(15), could
not be enforced following the close of the bankruptcy case.

-55Section 523(a)(3) need not operate in this same manner in order to protect the
corresponding interests of creditors without notice who are permitted to assert the
nondischargeability of their claims even after the close of the debtor’s bankruptcy case.124 As to
these claims, which include support claims arising under § 523(a)(5), the absence of notice to the
creditor during the debtor’s bankruptcy case does not have the same prejudicial impact. As a
result, the debtor’s failure to list the former spouse as a creditor on the schedule of debts in
bankruptcy does not absolutely preserve the former spouse’s support claim. Rather, the debtor
remains entitled to assert the dischargeability of alleged support debts in post-bankruptcy
litigation.125
For example, in McCarthy v. McCarthy126 the Connecticut Superior Court permitted the
bankruptcy debtor to litigate the dischargeability of the hold harmless obligation to his former
wife established in their divorce decree, in a post-bankruptcy family court proceeding.127 The
court allowed the debtor to establish that the obligation did not meet the standard of § 523(a)(5)
for nondischargeable support debts. The fact that the former wife had received no notice of the
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There are additional exceptions to the rule that § 523(a)(3) automatically preserves the
claims of creditors without notice. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 31, ¶ 523.09[5] (discussing
absence of prejudice to certain creditors resulting from lack of notice in no asset cases).
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See SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 6.08[4], at 6-117 and n.37a.
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McCarthy v. McCarthy, No. FA 93-0343580, 1995 WL 684831 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Nov. 8, 1995).
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The former wife’s pleadings in McCarthy requested a determination under § 523(a)(5)
as to the nondischargeability of her former husband’s direct, contractual liability the mortgage
lender. McCarthy at *1. The court reformulated her request to address the hold harmless debt
alone. Id. at *2.

-56earlier bankruptcy proceeding128 did not prevent the state court from discharging the hold
harmless obligation.129
As described in this Subsection, numerous complications arise in analyzing the
dischargeability of family support debts under § 523(a)(5), because the Bankruptcy Code
provides that the issue can be raised either during the debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding or in
subsequent litigation. Subsection B highlights the additional complications that may arise when
the delayed judicial determination is made in a state family court proceeding.
B.

The Federalism Issues

The laws of every state authorize family courts to enforce the financial provisions of an
earlier divorce decree, to modify those terms, and to make new orders in certain
circumstances.130 At the same time, these state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal bankruptcy court to determine the dischargeability of support debts under § 523(a)(5).131
Thus, the financial relationship of former spouses, following their divorce and the close of the
debtor’s bankruptcy case, may be modified by either a judicial determination about the
survivability of divorce-related support debts under § 523(a)(5), or new financial orders of the
family court. Both the state courts and the federal bankruptcy courts have sometimes
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Id. at *1.
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But see In re Marriage of Bauer, 605 P.2d 750, 751 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (“[N]othing in
the record before us indicates that the wife had either legal or actual notice of the bankruptcy
proceedings. Therefore, husband’s obligation to her was not discharged.”).
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See CLARK, supra note 20, §§ 16.5 to .7, 17.1 to .4 (discussing powers of the state
divorce courts over financial matters in the post-divorce family).
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See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007 (1990).

-57experienced difficulty in reconciling the two sets of legal rules—federal bankruptcy laws and
state family laws—governing these matters.
The financial orders in a typical divorce decree distribute the assets and liabilities of the
marriage and require the payment of child support and spousal support or maintenance by one
former spouse to the other.132 In the event of subsequent noncompliance by the obligor, the
divorce court may, in certain cases, enforce its orders by holding the noncompliant obligor in
civil contempt of court.133 Under the contempt power, the court may impose sanctions, including
fines and imprisonment, to coerce compliance with its initial order.134 Besides the remedy of
contempt, the family courts have other enforcement remedies at their disposal, including the
garnishment of wages, intercept of tax refunds, and imposition of liens on the obligor’s
property.135
In addition to these powers of enforcement, the family courts have the authority, under
certain circumstances, to modify the financial provisions of a divorce decree. As to support
awards for children and the former spouse, the general standard for modification is changed
financial circumstances of the parties affecting the continuing appropriateness or fairness of the
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See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 2, chs. 9-10 (discussing family support and property
laws in the context of divorce).
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See CLARK, supra note 20, § 16.6, at 673-76. There are, however, significant
limitations on the authority of the courts regarding the exercise of their contempt powers. In
many states, equitable distribution orders requiring the transfer of assets cannot be enforced by
holding the obligor in contempt of court. Id. at 673-74. Furthermore, since civil contempt is
used as a coercive measure, it is not invoked when the obligor is financially unable to comply
with the initial court order. Id. at 675-76.
134
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See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 2, § 9.06(2)(a), at 334-35.

See TURNER, supra note 16, § 9.05, at 644-51; GREGORY ET AL., supra note 2,
§ 9.06(2)(b).

-58initial order.136 Judicial authority to address the issue of spousal support in post-divorce
proceedings is generally premised on the entry of a support order in the original divorce
decree.137 By way of contrast, initial child support orders can be formulated at any time.138
As to the provisions of a divorce decree addressing the equitable distribution of assets
and liabilities, the powers of the family court in post-divorce proceedings are more restricted.
Unlike support obligations, property orders are regarded as final orders of the court. Thus, as a
general rule, these orders are not subject to modification.139 In exceptional cases, however, the
divorce court can modify the terms of an equitable distribution order, if one party satisfies the
general standard under state law for reopening final orders in civil litigation.140
The purpose of these state domestic relations laws governing the post-divorce family
differ from the goals of the federal bankruptcy laws regulating the dischargeability of divorcerelated debts. As a matter of policy, the Bankruptcy Code is designed to permit the bankruptcy
debtor to enjoy an economic fresh start,141 subject to limited exceptions for continuing family
responsibility. On the other hand, state laws governing the enforcement and modification of
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See CLARK, supra note 20, § 16.5, at 658-71 (alimony), § 17.2, at 724-33 (child

support).
137

D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN F. APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 698 (2d ed. 2002).

138

See CLARK, supra note 20, § 17.2, at 724.
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TURNER, supra note 16, § 9.06, at 651-53.
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discussed infra at text accompanying notes 156-66.
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1 GINSBERG & MARTIN, supra note 33, § 1.01[H], at 1-7 (discussing the goal in
bankruptcy law of “afford[ing] the honest debtor a fresh economic start”).

-59divorce decrees are concerned exclusively with the ongoing financial equities among family
members. The resulting tension between the state and federal laws governing the financial
affairs of the post-divorce family is reflected in many cases where the courts have trouble
reconciling the two sets of laws and conflicting policy goals. This tension is well-illustrated in
numerous cases involving the allocation of responsibility between former spouses for obligations
incurred jointly during marriage.
1.

The Nonenforceability of Discharged Property Settlement Obligations

The most straightforward interaction between federal bankruptcy law and state family
law occurs when the bankruptcy court makes a clear determination that a debtor’s divorcerelated obligations are dischargeable under § 523(a)(5) or § 523(a)(15). Here, the so-called
discharge injunction of Bankruptcy Code § 524(a)(2) bars any subsequent attempt by the
debtor’s former spouse to enforce the provisions of the parties’ divorce decree in state court.
Section 524 provides that the debtor’s discharge of a debt in bankruptcy “operates as an
injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action . . . to collect . . . any such
debt as a personal liability of the debtor . . . .”142 The discharge injunction applies to the debts
arising from a divorce court order requiring the debtor to repay obligations incurred during
marriage and to hold the former spouse harmless, if the bankruptcy court subsequently
determines these debts to be dischargeable. Thereafter, the state court has no authority to
enforce its earlier orders establishing the debtor’s obligations to the former spouse.

142

11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2001), discussed in 4 COLLIER, supra note 31, § 524.02.

-60The general principle of federal preemption of state law requires this result.143 The
Washington state court in In re Marriage of Myers144 relied on this principle in refusing to grant
the request of a bankruptcy debtor’s former wife to hold him in contempt of court for failing to
comply with certain divorce decree provisions. Specifically, the debtor had not repaid the thirdparty debts incurred during marriage and allocated to him for repayment at the time of divorce.145
The Myers court described the controlling effect of the former husband’s discharge of his
divorce-related obligations in bankruptcy on the power of the state court, as follows:
Mr. Myers cannot be recharged with debts which became his sole obligation as
part of a property settlement but which were later discharged in bankruptcy. Nor
could Mrs. Myers, who was named as a creditor in the bankruptcy proceeding,
enforce the provision in the dissolution decree holding her harmless from those
debts. This court is bound by the bankruptcy laws . . . .146
2.

The Reformation of Discharged Property Settlement Obligations

As illustrated by the Myers case, the doctrine of federal preemption bars the enforcement
in state court of a debt arising under the debtor’s settlement agreement or divorce decree, if the
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See generally JOHN W. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 319
(6th ed. 2000) (“The Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law overrides, i.e., preempts, any
state regulation where there is an actual conflict between the two sets of legislation.”).
144

In re Marriage of Myers, 773 P.2d 118 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
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Following the negative ruling on her enforcement petition described in the text,
Mrs. Myers returned to the state court and obtained an upward adjustment of alimony based on
the parties’ changed financial circumstances. See infra note 169.
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Myers, 773 P.2d at 121. See also Haines v. Haines, 501 N.W.2d 470 (Wis. Ct. App.
1993) (denying post-bankruptcy enforcement of a contempt order obtained by debtor’s former
wife prior to his bankruptcy, because the primary purpose of the contempt proceeding was debt
collection, and the debtor’s obligations to pay marital debts and to hold his former wife harmless
had been discharged in bankruptcy).

-61debt was clearly discharged in bankruptcy. Furthermore, the former spouse of the bankruptcy
debtor is generally precluded, as a matter of state law, from seeking relief in state court in the
form of a new or revised equitable distribution of property order. Unlike child support and
spousal maintenance orders,147 equitable distribution orders are regarded as final decrees of the
family court at the time of divorce. As a general rule, such orders cannot be reopened or
modified in a post-divorce modification proceeding.148 Exceptions can be made, however, under
state laws of general application providing for post-judgment relief from final orders in certain,
limited circumstances.149
For example, in In re Marriage of Beardslee150 the bankruptcy debtor’s former wife
obtained a court order reforming the property distribution provision of her divorce decree, under
the Kansas statute conferring discretion on civil trial courts to grant relief from final judgments
for “any . . . reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”151 In Beardslee, the
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The post-bankruptcy modification of alimony is discussed infra at text accompanying
notes 170-77.
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In Faster v. Childers, 416 N.W.2d 781 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), the state appellate court
reversed a trial court decision to reopen and modify the equitable distribution order in a
bankruptcy debtor’s divorce decree, following the debtor’s discharge of divorce-related debts in
bankruptcy. The appellate court relied upon the rule that property distribution orders were not
modifiable under state law. The discharged debts in the Childers case were the debtor’s
obligations relating to third-party debts incurred during the debtor’s marriage and allocated by
the divorce court to the debtor for repayment. After reversing the trial court’s decision to reopen
the property distribution order, the Minnesota Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial
court to consider the possible modification of the alimony provision in the debtor’s divorce
decree.
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See TURNER, supra note 16, at 651-53. See generally FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note
15, § 12.6 (discussing general rules governing relief from final judgments in civil litigation).
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In re Marriage of Beardslee, 922 P.2d 1128 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996).

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-260(b)(6) (currently codified at KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 60-260(b)(6) (West 1964 & Supp. 2003)), cited in Beardslee, 922 P.2d at 1132. Although this

-62initial divorce decree had awarded the family home to the former husband, and also required him
to assume the responsibility for two mortgages on the home. Specifically, the divorce decree had
ordered the former husband to refinance the first and second mortgages within three months, in a
manner that would relieve the former wife of all liability. A final provision in the divorce decree
had ordered the former husband to repay other marital debts and hold his former wife harmless
as to these liabilities. One year later the former husband, who had not refinanced the home or
repaid the other marital debts as required by the divorce decree, filed for bankruptcy. While the
bankruptcy case was pending, the former wife returned to the divorce court and obtained a
revised property distribution order.
The revised property settlement order in Beardslee required the immediate sale of the
marital home, distribution of the sale proceeds to satisfy the two mortgage loans and other
marital debts, and delivery of any balance to the former husband. According to the trial court,
this relief from the original provisions of the divorce decree was justified, in light of the former
husband’s noncompliance with the decree and his decision to file for bankruptcy. On appeal, the
Kansas Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court had properly applied the statute governing
relief from final judgments, quoted above, to reopen and revise the equitable distribution
provision in the bankruptcy debtor’s divorce decree. The appellate court affirmed the revised
equitable distribution of property order.

state statute confers discretion on the trial judge to reopen a final judgment “for any reason,”
Professor Friedenthal observes that such broad statutory language has generally been construed
by the courts in a narrow manner. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 15, at 579-81 (discussing
judicial imposition of “extraordinary circumstances” limitation on this type of broad statutory
standard). Narrow judicial construction of the statutory language reflects the strong interest of
the legal system in finality, especially as to property titles.

-63The timing of the two lawsuits in Beardslee highlights an additional procedural
complexity, which arises when the parties ask the state court and the federal bankruptcy court to
act simultaneously. The Bankruptcy Code provides the rule, observed by the state court in
Beardslee, which governs the federal-state jurisdictional conflict in this situation. Specifically,
Bankruptcy Code § 362152 requires the automatic stay of creditor litigation and other activity
involving the debtor’s property, upon the filing of the bankruptcy case.153 The opinion in
Beardslee stated that the bankruptcy court had granted Mrs. Beardslee’s request for a waiver of
this automatic stay, thereby enabling her to initiate an action in state court while her former
husband’s bankruptcy case was pending. Notably, the analysis of the issues in state court would
predictably have been the same if the former wife sought the revised equitable distribution order
in state court only after the close of the debtor’s bankruptcy case.
The Beardslee opinion does not provide any additional facts about the relative progress
of the two simultaneous proceedings. It appears, however, that the former husband’s discharge
of debts at the close of his bankruptcy case occurred during the pendency of the family court
proceeding. Thus, the Kansas family court in Beardslee cited the changed circumstances of the
parties resulting from the discharge of the former husband’s divorce-related debts, along with his
noncompliance with the earlier divorce court order, in granting relief to the former wife.
Even if the former spouse is able to overcome the threshold hurdle of satisfying the state
law standard for reopening a final judgment, as in Beardslee, another legal doctrine may prevent
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11 U.S.C. § 362 (2001), discussed in 3 COLLIER, supra note 31, ¶ 362.01(1)-(3).

Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code establishes certain exceptions to the general rule
that a bankruptcy proceeding automatically stays creditor activity involving the debtor’s
property, including an exception for certain actions involving the debtor’s family support
obligations. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2), discussed in 3 COLLIER, supra note 31, § 362.05[2].

-64the request for a revised property distribution from being heard by the court. Namely, the former
spouse’s effort to obtain a revised equitable distribution order may be defeated by the federal
preemption doctrine154 discussed above in the context of the Myers case.155 In Beardslee, for
example, the bankruptcy debtor argued (unsuccessfully) that the trial court’s revised property
settlement order, which required payment of the two mortgages and other marital debts out of the
property assigned to him at the time of divorce (the family home), was barred by the bankruptcy
court’s order discharging him of liability for those debts. The federal preemption claim here is
less compelling than the corresponding issue presented in the Myers case, where the former
spouse attempted to directly enforce the debtor’s obligations under the divorce decree after they
had been expressly discharged in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the reformed property settlement
order in a case like Beardslee would be unlawful under the preemption principle if it simply
reinstated discharged obligations of the debtor.156
In Beardslee, the Kansas Court of Appeals rejected the former husband’s preemption
claim. The court’s opinion does not clearly explain why the court’s revised property settlement
did not violate the bankruptcy court’s discharge injunction by simply reinstating the debtor’s
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See, e.g., Hogg v. Hogg, 816 A.2d 314 (Pa. Super. 2003) (reversing trial court decision
to “credit” former wife for amount of bankruptcy debtor’s discharged marital debts, when
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In re Marriage of Myers, 773 P.2d 118 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989), discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 144-46.
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Although the Beardslee court drew no distinction between the mortgage loans and the
unsecured marital debts, the trial court order to sell the family home to satisfy the mortgage loans
raises fewer concerns under the doctrine of federal preemption than the order involving
repayment of the unsecured marital debts. A discharge in bankruptcy extends only to the
debtor’s personal liability for debts, and does not affect security interests like the mortgages in
Beardslee. See 1 GINSBERG & MARTIN, supra note 33, ¶ 11.01[B], at 11-9 to -10. In Beardslee,
the debtor’s discharge in bankruptcy did not destroy the right of the mortgage lenders to
foreclose on the family home in the event of a default in repayment of the mortgage loans.

-65discharged obligations. According to the Beardslee court, the debts involved in the revised
divorce court order were not the same debts allocated to the former husband in the initial divorce
decree, because following his bankruptcy only the former wife was liable to the third-party
creditors. In the words of the court, “the district court recognized that [the former husband’s]
portion of the joint debts had been discharged, and . . . ordered [him] to pay them, recognizing
them as [the former wife’s] debts.”157 Based on this distinction, the Beardslee court concluded
that the revised order requiring payment of the mortgage loans from the sale of the husband’s
property did not reinstate the discharged obligations.
An alternative theory existed for rejecting the former husband’s federal preemption claim
in Beardslee. Namely, the former husband’s obligations under the revised state court property
settlement order were not the same as his obligations under the initial divorce decree, because the
initial decree required him to pay the marital debts out of his general assets, while the revised
decree ordered him to satisfy the debts out of the sale proceeds of the family home. The
distinction would be significant if the proceeds from the sale of the home were insufficient to pay
off the marital creditors, because under the revised order the former husband would not be liable
for the difference. This limitation of the former husband’s liability to the value of the house
supports the conclusion of the Beardslee court that the revised state court order did not violate
the discharge injunction of the bankruptcy court.
Unlike the Kansas state court in the Beardslee case, the bankruptcy court in In re
Brabham158 found a violation of the bankruptcy court’s earlier discharge injunction in a state
court’s modification of the bankruptcy debtor’s divorce decree. In Brabham, the initial divorce
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-66decree of the South Carolina family court included a provision dividing the debts incurred during
marriage between the divorcing spouses. The former wife was assigned the responsibility to
repay and hold her former husband harmless as to thirty-five percent of the marital debts, and the
remainder were allocated to the former husband. An additional provision of the property
distribution order required the former husband to transfer twenty percent of his military pension
to his former wife. Shortly after their divorce, the former wife filed for bankruptcy, and obtained
a general discharge of her debts. Following the close of her bankruptcy case, the debtor’s former
husband filed a motion in state court seeking to set aside the earlier financial orders of the
divorce court, and to obtain a new equitable distribution order.
The South Carolina rule of civil procedure applied in the Brabham case159 allowed for
relief from any final judgment in the discretion of the trial judge, based on equitable
considerations. Pursuant to this standard, the South Carolina family court granted the former
husband’s motion to set aside the financial provisions of the divorce decree, and scheduled a
hearing to reconsider the matters addressed therein. In the scheduled hearing, the former
husband planned to request an order permitting him to keep his entire pension, in light of the fact
that he was now solely liable for all of the marital debts. The South Carolina court had already
indicated its receptivity to this position when the court granted the former husband’s motion to
reopen the divorce decree.
Shortly after the South Carolina family court agreed to revise its equitable distribution
order, the former wife returned to the bankruptcy court, claiming that her former husband’s
action in state court violated the discharge injunction issued at the close of her bankruptcy case.
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The rule applied in the Brabham case was S.C.R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), cited in Brabham,
184 B.R. at 477, which was subsequently repealed.

-67As a threshold matter, the bankruptcy court in Brabham addressed the status of the debtor’s
divorce-related obligations. First, the bankruptcy court observed that the former wife’s joint
contractual liability to the third-party marital creditors had clearly been discharged in her earlier
bankruptcy proceeding. Next, the court made an initial determination under § 523(a)(5)
regarding dischargeability of the debtor’s obligation to hold her former husband harmless as to
thirty-five percent of their marital debts. After applying the federal standard for
nondischargeable family support debts to the facts of the case, the court ruled that the hold
harmless obligation failed to meet this standard and was also discharged.
On the key issue of preemption, the Brabham court ruled that the former husband’s
attempt to modify the property settlement in state court, by eliminating the bankruptcy debtor’s
claim to his pension benefits, constituted an unlawful effort to collect the debts that had been
discharged in bankruptcy. The court enjoined the former husband from proceeding on his
property claim in state court. Notably, the court “view[ed] the [former husband’s] efforts as de
facto collection actions, regardless of whether [he was] formally seeking a ‘dollar for dollar’
exchange.”160
The bankruptcy court in the Brabham case addressed the difficult issue of respect for the
authority of the state court, in the situation where the federal court’s order effectively denied
recognition to a ruling of the state family court as follows:
In making this ruling, this Court in no way seek [sic] to imply that it has authority
over the Family Courts of this State or that this Court does not acutely recognize
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Brabham, 184 B.R. at 488. See also Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 481 A.2d 1044, 1046 (Vt.
1984) (denying former spouse’s motion for relief from equitable distribution order on grounds of
fraud, because “to reopen proceedings in state court on this issue would be . . . in violation of
[the bankruptcy court’s discharge injunction under] § 524 . . . .”).

-68the Family Court’s expertise on domestic issues. . . . However, it is one of this
Court’s responsibilities to enforce the bankruptcy laws.161
The Brabham court expressly limited the scope of its ruling to the particular subject
matter of the case, namely, the former husband’s effort to reopen and modify a property
settlement order in state court. The bankruptcy court emphasized that its ruling did not extend to
the post-bankruptcy modification of alimony or child support orders in state court. According to
the opinion in Brabham, “whether the family court seeks to subsequently modify support,
maintenance or alimony, as opposed to a property settlement, is the paramount factor in the
determination of whether such action violates a prior bankruptcy discharge.”162 Indeed, the
modification of spousal maintenance and child support orders in the family court is the most
readily available avenue of relief for the former spouse in many cases, following the discharge of
a debtor’s responsibilities regarding pre-divorce marital debts. Unfortunately for the former
husband in Brabham, his waiver of any claim to alimony at the time of divorce163 precluded this
form of relief.
3.

The Post-Bankruptcy Modification of Child Support and Spousal
Maintenance Orders Following the Discharge of Divorce-Related Debts

The crucial distinction between the modification of an alimony or support order, on the
one hand, and the reopening of a property settlement order, on the other hand, emphasized in the
Brabham opinion above, is illustrated by the result in another bankruptcy court case, In re
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-69Danley.164 There, the New Mexico divorce court had initially ordered the former husband to
assume the responsibility for repaying certain debts incurred jointly with his wife during
marriage. The former husband’s subsequent discharge in bankruptcy resulted in the former
wife’s sole responsibility for these marital debts. Next, the family court granted the former
wife’s request for relief, by adjusting her alimony award upward from the amount of one dollar
to the amount of the debts discharged by the debtor in bankruptcy. Finally, the former husband
returned to bankruptcy court seeking relief from the revised state court judgment, based on the
theory of the Brabham case. The Danley court, however, denied his application, ruling that the
former wife had not violated the bankruptcy court’s earlier discharge injunction.
According to the bankruptcy court in Danley, the state court’s decision to increase the
alimony award was based on the general state law standard of changed financial circumstances,
which encompassed the economic changes for both former spouses resulting from the debtor’s
bankruptcy. The Danley court acknowledged that “[t]he state court’s compulsion of the debtor
to pay otherwise discharged obligations (as support measured by the amount and payment
schedule of the discharged obligation) can . . . frustrate the federal policy of a fresh start.”165
Nevertheless, the court did not view this result as a reinstatement of the former husband’s
discharged debts, or a violation of the bankruptcy court’s discharge injunction.
Unlike the bankruptcy court in the Brabham case, the Danley court deferred to the postbankruptcy decisions of the state court, which protected family interests at the expense of the
debtor’s fresh start. The crucial difference between the two cases, giving rise to such different
results in the final bankruptcy court forum, rested on the nature of the state court actions: the
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-70modification of an alimony award in Danley, and the proposed reformation of a property
distribution order in Brabham. Indeed, there are substantive differences between the relationship
of the former spouses under the law of alimony and under the equitable distribution doctrine,
which support the conclusion that the substitution of an alimony order for discharged property
settlement obligations is not a disguised effort to collect the discharged debts. Specifically,
under the laws of many states, alimony orders can be terminated upon the recipient’s death or
remarriage, while court orders allocating property and debts between former spouses are
unaffected by such changed circumstances.166 Furthermore, as described earlier, alimony orders
are generally modifiable based on future changes in the financial circumstances of the parties,
while equitable distribution obligations are not.167 Thus, the bankruptcy debtor’s obligation to a
former spouse under the revised alimony order in a case like Danley is different in nature from
the debtor’s discharged property settlement obligation, even when the dollar amounts of the two
obligations are the same.
A number of state courts have reached the same result on this issue as the bankruptcy
court in Danley. For example, the Connecticut state court in Lesniewski v. Walsh168 rejected the
bankruptcy debtor’s claim that an upward adjustment of alimony violated the discharge
injunction issued at the close of his post-divorce bankruptcy case.169 In Lesniewski, the parties’
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-71divorce decree required the former husband to pay alimony in the amount of one dollar per week,
and to hold his former wife harmless as to the joint marital debt owed to a credit union. During
the debtor’s subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, his former wife claimed that this hold harmless
obligation was in the nature of support and nondischargeable under § 523(a)(5). The bankruptcy
court rejected this claim, and discharged the former husband’s contractual liability to the thirdparty creditors as well as the hold harmless obligation to his former wife. Following the close of
the debtor’s bankruptcy case, the state family court in Lesniewski granted the former wife’s
request for increased alimony, based on the parties’ changed financial circumstances.
Specifically, the court relied on the fact that the former wife had been making payments of fifty
dollars per month to the credit union since the date of her husband’s discharge in bankruptcy. Of
course, the divorce court had anticipated at the time of divorce that the former husband would be
making these payments. The Lesniewski court ordered an increase in weekly alimony payments
from one dollar to seven dollars per week until the debtor had transferred the full amount of the
credit union debt to his former wife.
According to the Connecticut court in Lesniewski, revision of the alimony order in this
manner was not precluded by the bankruptcy court’s earlier ruling that the debtor’s hold
harmless obligation was a dischargeable nonsupport debt. Indeed, the court pointed out that the
bankruptcy court opinion rejecting the former wife’s claim under § 523(a)(5) had referred to the
possibility of increased alimony in a post-bankruptcy state court proceeding. The bankruptcy
court had stated: “In view of the [information contained in the divorce proceeding] transcript,

could not be subsequently enforced by the state court); In re Marriage of Eckert, 424 N.W.2d
759, 763 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (“We conclude that a state family court may modify a payor
spouse’s support obligation . . . following the payor’s discharge of [divorce-related debts,
including a hold harmless obligation,] in bankruptcy without doing major damage to the clear
and substantial federal interests of the bankruptcy code.”).

-72the [former wife] apparently may request an alimony modification upon nonpayment by the
debtor of the credit union debt. The [family court] may or may not grant such a request taking
into account present circumstances.”170
The bankruptcy court’s reference to “present circumstances” highlights an important
difference between the state law standard for modification of family support orders and the
federal law standard for identifying nondischargeable support obligations under § 523(a)(5) of
the Bankruptcy Code. The federal law standard for identifying nondischargeable support
obligations focuses primarily on the intent and circumstances of the parties at the time of the
divorce, but not their circumstances at the time of the debtor’s bankruptcy.171 By way of
contrast, as illustrated in the Lesniewski case, the state court modification proceeding requires an
additional inquiry into the condition of the parties at the time of the lawsuit. This difference
reinforces the widely-held view, expressed by the Lesniewski court, that the state court is not
foreclosed, under principles of federal preemption, from revisiting the support issue following
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SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 6.04(11). The authors observed, however, that
“(a) small minority of courts, led by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, has considered
one other factor in deciding whether a marital obligation is nondischargeable as support or
alimony. That factor is the circumstances of the parties at the time of the dischargeability
proceeding.” Id. at 6-48. The authors expressed the following concern about issue preclusion in
cases where the Sixth Circuit standard is applied:
[W]hen the bankruptcy court has refused to take current needs into account in its
dischargeability determination and those needs have changed since the original
marital agreement, . . . a state court should not be precluded from assessing the
current circumstances of the parties . . . . However, it is far more difficult to
justify a modification action when the bankruptcy court has already ruled upon
the amount necessary to satisfy the obligee spouse’s current needs under the
[Sixth Circuit] test . . . .
Id. ¶ 6.10, at 6-128 to -129.

-73the debtor’s discharge of divorce-related debts in bankruptcy. According to this view, the
bankruptcy law governing the discharge of divorce-related debts and the law of family support
are concerned with two distinct factual and legal matters.
In Lesniewski, the bankruptcy debtor’s former wife asserted a claim during the debtor’s
bankruptcy proceeding that the debtor’s obligation to hold her harmless as to the joint debt of
their marriage was not a nondischargeable support obligation under Bankruptcy Code
§ 523(a)(5). After the bankruptcy court rejected this claim and discharged the debtor’s
obligation to her, the former wife proceeded to state court where she received an increased
alimony award. In another category of cases, former spouses have sought state court relief
following bankruptcy proceedings in which the dischargeability of the debtor’s divorce-related
obligations was not addressed by the court. As discussed earlier, the Bankruptcy Code confers
jurisdiction on the state court in these circumstances to determine whether divorce-related
obligations of the bankruptcy debtor are nondischargeable support debts under § 523(a)(5).172
Thus, the state court in a post-bankruptcy proceeding may be required to simultaneously consider
the dischargeability of debts under the Bankruptcy Code and the availability of financial relief
for the former spouse under state family law doctrines, including the modification of alimony
awards.
The Connecticut state court in Peabody v. Peabody173 failed to successfully navigate this
point of intersection between federal bankruptcy law and state family law, in responding to the
request for increased alimony by the former wife of a bankruptcy debtor. In Peabody, the
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-74debtor’s divorce decree required him to repay and hold his former wife harmless as to two joint
marital obligations, including a second mortgage on the marital home. The divorce decree also
provided for periodic alimony in the amount of one dollar per year, “subject to modification only
in the event that the [husband] does not fulfill his obligation to indemnify the [wife] with respect
to said mortgage.”174 Several years later, the former husband defaulted on repayment of the two
loans, and filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court’s order of discharge clearly included his
joint contractual liability to the third-party creditors on the two marital debts. The bankruptcy
court did not, however, address the debtor’s repayment and hold harmless obligations to his
former wife arising under the divorce decree. Thereafter, the mortgage lender “made demand on
[the former wife], advising her of the [former husband’s] default and threatening foreclosure.”175
The second creditor had not initiated collection procedures, but the Peabody court observed that
such action in the near future was likely.176 In response to the creditor initiative, the former wife
returned to state court, requesting an upward adjustment of alimony in the amount needed to
make the monthly payments on the mortgage. Her former husband responded that all of his
responsibility arising from the joint marital debts had been discharged in bankruptcy.
The Peabody court’s analysis involved two steps. First, the court applied the federal
standard under Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(5) to the former husband’s obligations to repay the
marital debts and to hold his former wife harmless, and determined that they were
nondischargeable support debts. Next, the court proceeded to analyze the former wife’s alimony
modification request under the relevant Connecticut statutes and caselaw. Here, the court
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-75concluded that the state law standard of changed financial circumstances had been met, and
ordered weekly alimony payments to the former wife, to “terminate upon the death of either
party or the wife’s remarriage, and [to be] reduced to $1 per year upon the repayment by the
[former husband] of a sum equal to the present balance of the [mortgage] obligation.”177
The upward adjustment of alimony was not the best available remedy in the Peabody
case. Having determined that the former husband’s obligations to repay the marital debts and to
indemnify his former wife had survived his bankruptcy, the Peabody court could have simply
enforced these terms in the divorce decree. The property and support provisions of the initial
divorce decree reflected the view of the court that the assignment of marital debts to the husband
was preferable to an alimony order, as a means of providing family support. Notably, this
remedy was of greater benefit to the former wife because the husband’s repayment obligation,
unlike the alimony award, was not subject to early termination in the event of death or
remarriage. In Peabody, the court failed to take advantage of the opportunity to enforce the
former husband’s repayment and hold harmless obligations under the divorce decree, based on
its own determination that these obligations were nondischargeable support debts under
§ 523(a)(5).178
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In the Peabody case, discussed in the text, the state court failed to consider the
possibility of enforcing the divorce court order assigning pre-divorce marital obligations to the
bankruptcy debtor. A similar analytical shortcoming has been observed in state court cases
where the bankruptcy debtor’s divorce-related obligations took other forms, as follows:
State courts faced with motions to modify support obligations after a bankruptcy
case have, unfortunately, not always seemed to understand the principles
involved. In many case, they appear to have assumed that a debt designated a
property settlement [in the divorce decree] was discharged even though it had
been intended to serve a support function. Proceeding on this mistaken
assumption, these courts have then modified a support obligation in light of the

-76At the same time, the Peabody court’s analysis of the alimony remedy was flawed. The
court appeared to assume, mistakenly, that its ruling of nondischargeability as to the former
husband’s divorce-related debts was a necessary prerequisite to the upward adjustment of
alimony. In fact, as illustrated by the cases discussed earlier,179 an upward adjustment of
alimony is available under state law based on changed circumstances, even if the debtor’s
divorce-related obligations have been discharged in bankruptcy.
The court’s analysis in Peabody appears to have been shaped by the parties’ pleadings.
Initially, the former wife requested an upward adjustment of alimony. When the debtor raised
the issue of the dischargeability of his repayment and hold harmless obligations, the Peabody
court accepted the debtor’s formulation of how these two issues were related to each other.
Namely, the debtor erroneously alleged that a finding of dischargeability would be a defense to
his former wife’s alimony claim. The Peabody court failed to understand that its ruling of
nondischargeability of the divorce-related debts was not a prerequisite to adjusting the alimony
award, and that the ruling provided an alternative theory for addressing the financial claims of
the former wife.180 As illustrated by the Peabody case, the role of the state court in addressing

assumed discharge when they should instead have determined that the “property
settlement” had really been in the nature of support and had not been discharged
at all.
SOMMER ET AL., supra note 24, ¶ 6.10, at 6-129.
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In a case factually similar to the Peabody case, the New York court in Mina v. Mina,
652 N.Y.S.2d 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), avoided the analytical confusion of the Peabody
opinion. In the post-bankruptcy proceeding in Mina, the New York court first observed that the
question of dischargeability of the debtor’s hold harmless obligation to his former wife had not
been addressed in the bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore, the state court made its own
determination that the obligation was a nondischargeable support debt under § 523(a)(5). Since

-77the request of the bankruptcy debtor’s former spouse for post-bankruptcy relief under state law
becomes complicated, when the issue of dischargeability of divorce-related debts in bankruptcy
arises for the first time in the same state court action.
A final issue arising under the doctrine of post-bankruptcy alimony modification, in cases
involving allocated marital debts, involves the nature of the hold harmless obligation imposed on
the debtor at the time of divorce. As a general rule, family court judges have wide discretion to
determine whether the circumstances of the parties have changed in a manner that would justify
the modification of alimony and, if so, the appropriate adjusted amount. The simple fact that the
obligor spouse has declared bankruptcy does not justify the modification of alimony, absent
evidence that the bankruptcy has affected either the needs of the obligee or the obligor’s ability
to pay. Not surprisingly, the nexus between the discharge of divorce-related debts in bankruptcy
and the relevant changed financial circumstances of the former spouses is easily established in
many cases. For example, the changed circumstances justifying an increased alimony award in
Lesniewski v. Walsh,181 discussed above, included the former wife’s assumption of the marital
debts allocated to her former husband in their divorce, after he discharged those debts in
bankruptcy.
The impact of the debtor’s bankruptcy on the former spouse would be more speculative,
however, if the discharged debt to the former spouse was a hold harmless obligation, and the
former spouse had not made any payments to the third-party creditor. In In re Marriage of

the obligation had survived the debtor’s bankruptcy, the court ordered him to reimburse his
former wife for the amount she had paid to the third-party marital creditor.
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Lesniewski v. Walsh, No. 98-76988S, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 713 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Mar. 7, 2001), discussed supra at text accompanying notes 168-72.

-78Ganyo,182 the bankruptcy debtor argued that no upward adjustment of the alimony award to his
former wife was appropriate in this situation until the third-party creditor actually approached
her for payment of the debts they had incurred jointly during marriage. The Minnesota court
rejected this argument, and granted the former wife’s request for increased alimony.183 In
addition to the former wife’s loss of protection under the discharged hold harmless guarantee, the
court relied upon other changed financial circumstances of the parties, including the debtor’s
enhanced ability to pay spousal support resulting from the discharge of his liability to the marital
creditors.184 As in the other cases discussed above, the court in Ganyo determined that the entry
of an increased alimony award in light of changed financial circumstances was not barred by the
federal ban on collection of the debtor’s discharged obligations relating to allocated marital
debts.
4.

The Problems Created in State Court by the Existence of Multiple
Obligations Relating to Allocated Marital Debts

The allocation of marital debts to one former spouse at the time of divorce creates a
complex set of rights and duties involving the marital creditors and both former spouses. As
discussed earlier in Section III, the existence of multiple, related obligations in these
circumstances has complicated the analysis of claims arising under § 523(a)(5) and § 523(a)(15),
when the debtor seeks to discharge the divorce-related obligations in bankruptcy court.185 As an
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Bankruptcy court cases involving the multiple obligations of bankruptcy debtors
relating to allocated marital debts are examined supra in Section III of this article.

-79example, the bankruptcy court may fail to separately consider whether a ruling of
nondischargeability extends to each aspect of the debtor’s liability relating to the allocated debts.
The same type of analytical complexity, flowing from the existence of multiple obligations, also
arises when the debtor’s former spouse pursues financial remedies in state court following the
debtor’s bankruptcy.
In Marden v. Marden,186 for example, the former husband assumed exclusive
responsibility for certain joint marital debts at the time of his divorce, and agreed to hold his
former wife harmless as to those debts. Following his post-divorce bankruptcy, the marital
creditors turned to the former wife for repayment, and she negotiated a repayment schedule in
the amount of $500 per month. Her subsequent lawsuit in state family court requested an
upward adjustment of child support in this same amount, which involved a substantial upward
deviation from the applicable state child support guideline amount.187 In granting her request,
the Minnesota court in Marden engaged in a rather strained interpretation of the state child
support law. Notably, the court gave no consideration to the alternative and less controversial
theory, that relief for the bankruptcy debtor’s former spouse in the same dollar amount might be
available under the repayment and hold harmless provisions of their divorce decree. The
Marden court failed to consider the availability of this alternative remedy, apparently because the
court failed to identify the multiple, component obligations arising from the allocation of marital
debts to the former husband at the time of divorce.
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-80The Minnesota Court of Appeals in Marden observed that the debtor’s contractual
liability to the marital creditors had been discharged in his bankruptcy case, but made no
reference whatsoever to the separate obligations owed by the debtor to his former wife. The
court apparently and mistakenly believed that the discharge of liability to the third-party
creditors automatically extended to the repayment and hold harmless obligations imposed on the
former husband in the divorce decree. Neither the parties in their pleadings nor the opinion of
the court raised the possibility that these divorce-related obligations might have survived his
bankruptcy, as nondischargeable family support debts under Bankrtupcy Code § 523(a)(5).188
The failure to identify the component obligations of the former husband, arising from the
assignment of marital debts in the divorce decree, precluded any consideration of the most
appropriate remedy for the bankruptcy debtor’s dependent family members.
Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Hopkins v. Hopkins189 failed to identify the
component debts involved in the repayment and hold harmless provisions of a bankruptcy
debtor’s divorce decree, and analytical confusion followed. In Hopkins, the former husband was
ordered by the divorce court to repay and hold his former wife harmless from the joint debts of
their marriage. Regarding alimony, the divorce decree provided that the wife waived alimony,
and that the husband’s assumption of the marital debts owed to third-party creditors was “a
condition of the waiver of alimony.”190 Following the divorce, the former husband declared
bankruptcy. According to the Hopkins court, the bankruptcy court held a hearing under
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-81§ 523(a)(5), and determined that “the debts described in the divorce decree were the result of a
property settlement rather than an award of alimony and, therefore, ordered the debts
discharged.”191 Thereafter, in response to a lawsuit against the former wife by one of the marital
creditors, she attempted to enforce the hold harmless provision in her divorce decree.192
In the state court enforcement proceeding, a question remained as to which debts were
included in “the debts described in the divorce decree,” noted above, which had been expressly
discharged by the bankruptcy court. The Rhode Island trial court did not raise this question, but
apparently assumed that the discharge in bankruptcy extended beyond the debtor’s contractual
liability to the third-party marital creditors and included his obligations to the former wife under
the divorce decree to repay those debts and to hold her harmless. Having failed to address the
potential survivability (and enforceability) of the divorce-related debts in this manner under
§ 523, the trial court in Hopkins entered a new order requiring the former husband to hold his
former wife harmless as to the marital debts. The new order, which duplicated the prior hold
harmless order, was characterized as a modified alimony order. The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island affirmed this result.
As illustrated by the Marden and Hopkins cases, the complex financial status of the
debtor who assumed responsibility at the time of divorce for debts incurred during marriage has
generated confusion, when the debtor’s former spouse seeks post-bankruptcy relief in state court.
Here, the parties and the court may mistakenly assume that a discharge in bankruptcy of the
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Id. (emphasis added).

The state court proceeding in Hopkins was filed by the former wife sometime before
the close of the debtor’s bankruptcy case, and stayed pending the outcome of the bankruptcy
case. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59 (discussing automatic stay under Bankruptcy
Code § 362).

-82debtor’s contractual obligations to the third-party marital creditors automatically extends to the
debtor’s obligations to repay and hold the former spouse harmless as to these discharged debts.
Such an assumption unnecessarily limits the financial remedies available for dependent family
members in state court.193
The analytical difficulties encountered by the state courts in Marden and Hopkins are a
final illustration of the theme repeated throughout this Article. Namely, the allocation of joint
marital debts to one spouse at the tine of divorce is frequently the first step in what proves to be a
complex financial dance involving both former spouses and their creditors over an extended
period of time. Subsequent steps may take the parties through several rounds of litigation in
bankruptcy court and in state family court. The legal issues to be resolved may include the
dischargeability of each strand of the obligated spouse’s indebtedness relating to the joint marital
debts, and the impact of these determinations on subsequent property and support claims under
state law. The rules governing the rights of parties at each step are complex and interrelated, and
they require careful application in each case.
CONCLUSION
Post-divorce bankruptcy is a common phenomenon in the experience of lawyers who
represent clients in a family law or bankruptcy law practice. The legal issues that typically arise
in the divorced debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding include questions about the dischargeability of
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The same false assumption has sometimes been made in post-bankruptcy state court
cases, when the debtor’s bankruptcy preceded the debtor’s divorce. See Hudson v. Hudson, 634
So. 2d 579 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (ruling that a hold harmless obligation imposed by the
bankruptcy debtor’s divorce decree had been automatically discharged in the debtor’s predivorce bankruptcy, along with his underlying contractual liability to the third-party marital
creditor). But see Ray v. Ray, 905 P.2d 692 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995) (identifying the hold harmless
provision in debtor’s post-bankruptcy divorce decree as an enforceable obligation distinct from
the discharged underlying obligation to the third-party marital creditor).

-83divorce-related debts. The answers to these questions are found at the intersection of federal
bankruptcy law and the state laws governing financial claims between family members. This
area of law and legal practice is challenging and complex. Within this general context, the
existence of third-party marital debts allocated for repayment to the bankruptcy debtor at the
time of divorce introduces additional layers of complexity.
Most divorcing couples leave their marriages with debts as well as assets, and many
separation agreements and divorce decrees allocate these pre-divorce marital debts to one former
spouse for repayment. When this occurs, the former spouse to whom joint marital debts are
allocated leaves the divorce court with one or more new obligations to the other former spouse
relating to the allocated debts, along with continuing contractual liability to the third-party
creditors. If the obligated spouse subsequently files for bankruptcy, a thorough analysis of the
debtor’s family-related obligations would involve the separate consideration of each of the
debtor’s several obligations here, as a potentially nondischargeable debt. The analysis is further
complicated by various rules governing the timing of nondischargeability claims and the forums
where these claims can be heard, and the simultaneous applicability of state laws governing
financial interests in the post-divorce family.
The topic of allocated marital debts presents unique analytical challenges for lawyers,
judges, and students of the law who seek to understand the federal and state laws governing the
financial interests of family members following divorce. Numerous legal issues may arise in
state court and in federal bankruptcy court when the divorce court allocates the debts incurred
during marriage to one former spouse, who subsequently declares bankruptcy. This Article has
provided a road map for understanding and analyzing these issues.

